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Steganography is the science of hiding data in otherwise plain text or images.
Fractal image compression is a lossy method for compressing a graphical image. The 
compression involves finding a representation of an image in terms of a set of fractals. A 
fractal is a mathematical formula for describing an image or sub-image.
The new and novel steganographic method detailed in this thesis involves producing a 
new image that is visually and statistically similar to the original image. The produced 
new image will have steganographic data hidden in it. The method exploits the fact that 
image data isn’t sensitive to noise. The algorithm selects regions of the image that are 
visually least sensitive to modification. Fractal image compression theory is used to 
construct fractal transforms which when applied to other regions o f the image produce 
slight modifications in these least sensitive areas. A modified area is visually similar to 
the original region. The modified area is also statistically similar to surrounding areas. 
Hiding the steganographic data involves producing a new region in the manner described 
for each bit of steganographic data.
The security of the method was tested under various conditions. The results show that the 
method is a very secure means of hiding and retrieving steganographic information. An 
Investigation was made in a series of techniques which allow steganographic information 
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1 . 1  Introduction
Since the arrival of computers there has been a vast dissemination of information, some 
of which needs to be kept private, some of which does not. Plaintext is the name given to 
information that is to be put into secret form. The information may be hidden in two basic 
ways. The methods of steganography conceal the very existence of the secret 
information. The methods of cryptography on the other hand, do not conceal the 
presence of a secret information, but render it unintelligible to outsiders by various 
transformations of the plaintext. The cryptologist1 is the entity that performs 
cryptography. The stegator is the entity that performs steganography. The cryptanalyst 
is the entity that tries to break the cryptographic code, or find the steganographic 
information.
Steganography is the science of hiding data in otherwise plain text or images. When 
steganography is applied to electrical communications it is called transmission security. 
Steganography is a method by which a message can be disguised, by making it appear to 
be something else. It derives from two Greek words Stego- meaning roof or cover, and 
graphy meaning writing. Stego is the same word used in stegosaur or roof lizard, because 
of the large bony plates that decorate its back. Steganography means covert writing.
Steganography is an old science but its application in computer based methods is new. 
The objective of this thesis is the development of a steganographic method, that is based
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on the fractal image compression of images. Because computer based steganography is a 
new area; there is little published material in the field. Also as far as we are aware, this is 
the first time an attempt has been made, to apply fractal image compression to 
steganography. Therefore to learn basic steganographic strategies and techniques, an 
investigation was made into the history o f steganography. The documentation of this 
investigation is in section 1.3.
Computer based steganography2 is usually based on randomness. There is plenty of 
examples of random data in computer based information. Steganographic data can be 
hidden into this random information. The merits o f a steganographic method are judged 
on whether or not, the addition of the steganographic data changes the perceived 
randomness3.
Image files are good examples of random data. The data in image files represent a set of 
pixels, which when displayed on a computer system, give an approximation to a 
particular image. Image files are made up of portions that are visually constant. For 
example, in a scanned picture of a person, parts of the person’s hair may be visually 
constant. However the pixel values representing these parts, and the boundaries between 
the parts are not usually constant. These variations can be due to lighting effects in the 
original picture.
The variations in the visually constant parts of a given image, leads to a random spread of 
noise over the image. Therefore an image file contains random data. An investigation into 
currently available methods which exploit this randomness was made as part of the thesis. 
Some of these steganographic methods exploit the random spread of noise over an image 
as a means to data hiding. There is very little research into finding visually constant parts 
of an image and using these for data hiding. The documentation of this investigation is in 
Chapter 2.
Fractal image compression was chosen as a basis for the new steganographic technique, 
because it is a lossy method of image compression. Fractal image compression takes as 
input an image file, and produces an approximation to this image. The objective in fractal
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image compression is to find parts of an image that match one another. The matching 
process involves finding a transformation, which maps a portion of the image to a smaller 
portion. The output of the fractal image compression process is a set of these 
transformations. A fractal is a set of transformations which when applied to any image 
always yields the same output image. The output image is known as the attractor of the 
fractal transformations. Fractal image decompression yields an image which is an 
approximation to the original. If  steganography could be applied during the fractal image 
compression process, then it would be difficult for a cryptanalyst to decide if the resulting 
image degradation was due to the compression process or due to data hiding. There are 
numerous different algorithms and strategies for achieving fractal image compression. 
The main effort in this thesis was an investigation to find the best steganographic method 
that could be devised using any one of a multitude of fractal image compression 
techniques. Fractal image compression is discussed in Chapter 3.
Least Squares Polynomial Approximation is discussed in chapter 4. This is the theory 
required for the retrieval of the steganographic data in our algorithm.
Chapter 5 discusses the DCT (Discrete Cosine Transform ). This is the theory for various 
techniques that were tried to enhance our algorithm of chapter 6.
The new and novel steganographic method detailed in this thesis, involves producing a 
new image that is visually and statistically identical to the original image. The produced 
new image will have steganographic data hidden in it. The method selects parts of the 
image that are visually least sensitive to modification. Fractal image compression theory 
is used to identify a series o f sub-images (selected range blocks) and a corresponding 
series of matching sub-images (domain blocks). The matching process produces a domain 
block and a fractal transform. When this fractal transform is applied once to the domain 
block it produces a new sub-image that is visually similar to the original range block. The 
domain blocks are collected into a domain library, and the library is then split into two 
halves. If  the current bit of steganographic data is a 0, we search for a match in the first 
half o f the domain library, otherwise we search the second half. The algorithm selects a 
range block, and then for each domain block in the selected half of the domain library,
3
determines the components of the fractal transform. When the transform is applied to the 
domain block, it produces a new range block that is visually like the original range block. 
The algorithm selects the domain block (if any), that through this process produces a new 
range block, which is most visually like the original range block. Hiding the 
steganographic data involves producing a new range block, in the manner described, for 
each bit of steganographic data. The method is discussed in great detail in chapter 6.
Chapter 7 contains the results. The results section shows the theory of chapter 6 in action 
and the results show that the theory works. The results presented in this section are drawn 
from a proof of concept implementation.
Chapter 8 discusses various enhancements to the basic algorithm to increase the security 
o f the method. Various techniques are presented some of which are mutually exclusive.
Chapter 9 discusses an enhancement to the method, which allows it to be used in 
multimedia document labelling. In multimedia environments the multimedia documents 
would be subjected to normal image processing operations which do not seriously reduce 
the quality of the document. Therefore the steganographic data could also be subjected to 
for example lossy image compression, image format conversions.
Chapter 10 discusses enhancements to the basic algorithm if the priority of the user is for 
steganographic ability. In this chapter we assume that no lossy imaging techniques, have 
been applied to the steganographic image.
Chapter 11 presents a series of conclusions drawn from the research.
1 .2  Introduction to our algorithm
• The method takes as input an image file and the steganographic data and produces a 
new image file that contains the steganographic data. The output image file is called 
the steganographic image file and it is similar to the input image file.
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• Fractal image compression4 techniques were chosen as a basis for the method.
• Fractal image compression operates in the spatial domain.
• The frequency domain has been shown to be most suited for multimedia document 
labelling. However we have attempted to adapt our method so that it can be used as a 
multimedia document labelling5 method.
• Fractal image compression techniques naturally identify parts of the image that are 
most suited for data hiding.
• The Fractal image compression process splits the image into blocks. Blocks that are 
visually similar are identified.
• One bit of steganographic data is hidden by
1. Transforming one similar block into an approximation for another.
2. Storing the approximation in position of the original block in the 
steganographic image file.
• The transforming block is random and so the transformed block is also random. The 
pixels themselves have not changed in randomness. The relationship between pixels in 
the steganographic image file have changed.
• The idea of a visual key naturally evolved from the method. The image is split into 
two regions. Blocks in one region are modified as described above. Blocks from the 
other region are used in the comparison process. The user selects the position of each 
region in the image by moving bounding boxes over the image. The bounding boxes 
are positioned on a pixel boundary, thus the user has to remember the co-ordinates of 
the bounding boxes. When retrieving the steganographic label the user would have to 
specify the correct two regions.
• Multiple steganographic labels may be hidden in the same image. Giving the ability to 
store bogus messages.
• The steganographic label can be encrypted before being hidden. The encryption key 
could be stored in another part of the image.
• As far as we are aware this is the first time an attempt has been made to apply fractal 
image compression to steganography.
• Because fractal image compression techniques have been applied to moving pictures 
our steganographic method can also exploit this medium.
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1 .3  History of Stegano graphy
Steganography is a science which dates back to ancient times. It has been used by 
ordinary people, spies, rulers, governments, armies etc. down through the ages.
It is the original method of information concealment. Information has been hidden in 
drawings, paintings, books, newspapers, in speech, in written word, even in postage 
stamps.
The information in this section is mainly taken from the excellent works by Kahn6 7 
which documents the history of cryptography from its beginnings.
1.3.1 A ncient tim es
The Greeks
In a story about Bellerophon from Homer's Iliad we have the first reference to secret 
writing. Bellerophon was a famous warrior and loved by all the women in his land. 
Queen Anteia told her husband Proetus that Bellerophon tried to ravish her. She did this 
because Bellerophon rejected her advances. King Proetus wanted to put Bellerophon to 
death but it was a thing that he dared not do. So Proetus sent Bellerophon carrying a 
message of introduction to Proetus's Father-in-law the Lycian King. The message was 
written on stone and it contained some allusion to the manner in which the King had 
treated Glaucus, naming someone whom the king had assassinated. The message was 
such that Bellerophon did not know its real meaning even though he could read it. The 
King forced Bellerophon to perform numerous dangerous tasks in the hope that he would 
be killed. Bellerophon successfully completed all the tasks given him so eventually the 
King relented. The King realising that Bellerophon stood under the divine protection of 
the gods and gave him his daughter and half his kingdom.
Several stories in the Histories of Herodotus deal specifically with methods of 
steganography. One story relates that a message from Harpagus was placed in the belly of
6
a hare. The hare was carried past the unsuspecting road guards of the king of Medes to 
Cyrus, king of Persia. The message helped Cyrus defeat the king of Medes in battle.
According to Herodotus one of the most important messages in the history of Western 
civilisation was transmitted secretly. It gave the Greeks the crucial information that Persia 
was planning to conquer them.
The Greek Aeneas the Tactician wrote a entire chapter on communications security in 
one of his works on military science. Therein he listed several steganographic systems. 
One example is that holes representing the letters of the Greek alphabet were bored 
through a disk and the disk used to convey the secret message. Another which is still in 
use in the 20th century suggested pricking holes in a book above or below the letters of 
the secret message.
The Egyptians
The Egyptians used illustrations to conceal messages. The idea being that one party could 
send the illustration to the other in reasonable confidence that if  the messenger was 
questioned then the illustration would not arouse any interest from his enemies.
Some of the hieroglyphics on the monuments of the Egyptians contain secret writing. The 
artist would describe the life of his master but would put in some hidden meaning. It 
became a kind of a contest where a person was recognised as being more important if  his 
life story contained more of this secret information. In order to put in the secret 
information the writing became so complex that nobody but the writer could understand 
the story. Therefore the practice began to died out.
The Chinese
The Chinese would often write on thin silk or paper, which they rolled into a ball and 
covered in wax. A messenger hid the ball somewhere on his person, sometimes by 
swallowing it. This is a form of steganography.
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1.3.2 Middle Ages
Cryptography became very common place in the middle ages. Secret writing was 
employed by the Catholic Church in its various struggles down the ages and by the major 
governments of the time. Steganography was normally used in conjunction with 
cryptography to further hide secret information.
T he m on k  T rithem ius
In the late 1400s a monk named Trithemius wrote many excellent books on religion, on 
the lives of famous people including princes and monks, on the life of saint Maximum 
etc. In 1499 he wrote a set o f books which he called Steganographia meaning covered 
writing. He detailed telepathical methods of message passing. For example one way to 
send a secret message was to say it over an image o f a planetary angel at a moment 
determined by complicated astrological calculations, wrap the image up with the image of 
the recipient and say the proper incantations. He told of using a network of angles for 
thought transference and for gaining a knowledge of all things happening in the world. He 
got into a lot of trouble with the Church because of these books. But later he wrote six 
books (in a average of ten days each) on what he called Polygraphia because of the 
multiplicity of ways of writing that it included. It mainly dealt with methods of 
cryptography.
V en ice in the 1500s
In the 1500s cryptanalysis was very important to the Council of Ten who ruled Venice. 
When cipher dispatches fell into the hands o f the Venetians their translation was ordered 
at once. The Council of Ten held a contest in ciphers in which a Marco Rafael produced a 
new method for invisible writing.
G irolam o C ardano
Girolamo Cardano was born in 1501 in Milan. He published 131 books and left behind 
111 in manuscript. He discussed mathematics, astronomy, physics, chess, gambling, 
death etc. He also wrote two books on cryptography and he produced the Cardano grille.
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The Cardano grille is a sheet of stiff material into which rectangular holes are cut at 
irregular intervals. The encipherer lays the grille over a sheet o f writing paper and writes 
the secret message through the perforations. The perforations can take a whole word, a 
letter or a syllable. He then removes the grille and fills in the spaces with an innocuous- 
sounding cover message. The decipherer simply places his grille on the message he 
receives and reads the hidden information through the perforations. The problem with this 
method is that awkwardness in phrasing may give away the fact that a message is being 
sent. Many countries made use of the Cadano grille in their diplomatic correspondence in 
the 1500s and 1600s.
P irrho  Musefili
In Florence from 1540 to 1557 Pirrho Musefili solved ciphers for clients. Among his 
clients was the King of England who sent him a cryptogram that had been found in a sole 
of a pair o f golden shoes.
Giovanni Porta
Giovanni Porta was bom in Naples in 1535. He wrote numerous books on human 
physiology, meteorology, refraction o f light, the design o f villas and 14 books of prose. 
He also wrote a collection o f 20 books which he called Magia Naturalis in which he 
recorded natural science oddities. One of these books gave numerous recipes for secret 
ink and for such tricks as writing invisibly on an egg and on human skin. He wrote so that 
messengers may be sent, who shall neither know that they carry letters nor can they be 
found about them. He also described hiding messages in living creatures, for example by 
feeding a letter in meat to a dog and then killing him to retrieve it.
M ary Queen of Scots
In the 1570s Mary Queen o f Scots was the heir apparent to the throne of England. But 
Elizabeth was the Queen. Mary was held incommunicado under house arrest in Chartley. 
But she was able to communicated with the French by enciphering messages and hiding 
them in beer kegs. But unfortunately for Mary a double agent was giving over the 
messages to Elizabeth’s secret service. Mary was convicted of high treason and was 
executed along with six young men who were to assassinate Elizabeth.
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John Wilkins
In 1641 John Wilkins who was the Bishop of Chester wrote the first book in English on 
cryptology. He described a system where a message is represented as dots, lines and 
triangles. Letters are represented as dots. These dots are then connected to form lines and 
triangles. The encrypted message looks like a drawing or some kind of graph.
The Culpers
In 1779 two American agents Samuel Woodhull and Robert Townsend supplied George 
Washington with information about the Redcoat occupation of New York. They signed 
themselves the Culpers and used page and line numbers from books. They used invisible 
ink extensively. Washington supplied them with the ink getting it from Sir James Jay. Jay 
was a physician in London and his brother was an American statesman. James Jay had 
experimented in producing this secret ink for several months before sending the 
completed product to his brother.
The Culpers customarily wrote their message on a blank sheet of paper, inserting it in a 
predetermined point in a whole package of the same paper. This method of secret writing 
was very successful and the Culpers give details of troop movements, what provisions 
were entering the town, etc. without ever being caught.
Benjamin Thompson
The Redcoats used invisible ink even earlier than the Americans. For example Benjamin 
Thompson detailed some military plans of the New England patriot forces. He described 
how the Americans were going to attack Boston. The English were able to prevent this 
attack. He used gallotannic acid for his ink in a method described by Porta in his Natural 
Magick.
The black cham bers
In the late 1700s almost all European countries had a secret service and had what was 
known as a black chamber. The black chamber consisted of a group of people who open 
letters of their countrymen as well as foreigners. The correspondence of the newly created 
American nation was also scrutinised. Most of the American’s secret writing was in
1 0
invisible ink. In 1777 English chemists discovered a number of letters in secret ink which 
were written by Benjamin Franklin.
1.3.3 M odern tim es
A spy's success depends on his not being seen or heard. Messages have to be sent in a 
steganographic manner using open codes, microdots, hollow heels, invisible inks etc. 
Spies had to be very clever to evade the censorship bureau which played a big part in the 
life of ordinary people during the World Wars because all mail was scrutinised.
S ecret inks
Spies in World War I and II used invisible inks extensively. One system they used was 
suggested by Aeneas where the letters of newspapers and books were dotted with 
invisible ink. But with newspapers being carried as third-class mail this was not the 
fastest method of getting information to where it was going.
In 1940 British censorship in Bermuda stopped a letter because the language seemed 
forced. There were many more letters from the same author who signed that letters as Joe 
K. After much analysis by chemists and scientists secret-ink writing was found on the 
back of the typed sheets. This secret writing gave details of troop movements etc.
Other such secret-ink writings were discovered by the same station in Bermuda. A man 
was executed in Cuba for secretly sending information on the ships that were being 
loaded in Havana harbour. He used Spanish-language letters that contained the secret 
writings, but the Spanish had a rather Germanic cast and so was suspect.
Nazi spies employed many measures to frustrate the secret writing tests of the censorship 
bureau, one was to split a piece of paper, write a secret-ink message on the inner surface 
then rejoin the halves. With the ink on the inside no reagent applied to the outside could 




In Jargon code an apparently innocuous word stands for the real in a text that has been 
made look as innocent as possible. Jargon code was used extensively during the World 
Wars.
In 1917 Captain William Hall was head of the cryptanalytic group of the British navy. 
This group was known as Room 40 their room number in the Admiralty. Their job was to 
analyse any German cryptographic information captured by the British.
Trebitsch Lincoln was an embittered former member of Parliament. He sent a lot of 
military information to the Germans in jargon code. In one of his jargon systems, family 
names meant ships or ports; in another, various petroleum products stood for them. A 
message that read Cable prices five consignments Vaseline, eight paraffin really meant 
[At] Dover [there are] //ve first-class cruisers, eight sea-going destroyers. Lincoln evaded 
the British authorities and escaped to New York.
In World War II a series of letters describing the condition and availability of dolls 
escaped detection as they appeared innocent even though the letters contained jargon 
code. Suspicion was drawn to them when one was returned from Buenos Aires, marked 
Unknown address, to the lady marked as sender. Not having sent it, the lady brought it to 
the FBI. I  have just secured a lovely Siamese Temple Dancer the letter said and it had 
been damaged. But now it is repaired and I  like it very much. Other letters contained text 
like The broken English dolls will be in the doll hospital for a few months before repairs 
can be completed. The doll hospital is working day and night. The FBI determined that 
the dolls represented warships in jargon code, each kind a specific type of ship. The 
English dolls referred to above now reads:- The damaged English warships will be in the 
shipyard for several months before repairs can be completed. The shipyard is working 
day and night. The trail to the spy lead to a Mrs. Dickinson who ran an exclusive doll 
shop in New York. She was found to have received thousands of dollars from Japanese 
officials for her illegal activities. Mrs. Dickinson was executed for being spy.
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N u ll c ip h er and geom etrica l code
In the null cipher only certain words and letters in text that contains the null are 
significant for example every fifth word. Letters written that contain the null cipher can 
sound very strained because of the difficulty in getting the correct order to the words of 
the secret message. Because o f this the null ciphers were not used by spies but by loyal 
Americans who were trying to beat the censor.
In the geometrical open code the significant words can be placed at locations decided 
before hand by the sender and receiver for example at the intersections of the lines, near 
punctuation marks, breaking the flow of handwriting near significant letters. These codes 
were used extensively throughout the World Wars. The Cardano grille allows the hiding 
of a message by using geometrical code.
M icrodots
The chief difficulty with secret inks was their inability to handle the great volume of 
information that spies had to transmit. This was solved with what J. Edgar Hoover called 
the enemy's masterpiece of espionage the microdot. The microdot was a circular 
photograph of an espionage message which was 0.05 inches in diameter. The spy inserted 
the microdot over a period in a letter and cemented it in place. The Mexican microdot 
ring microphotographed trade and technical publications that were barred from 
international channels and sent them to addresses in Europe with as many as twenty 
microdots in a single letter.
Microdots are very shiny so to conceal them many techniques were used such as 
gumming them onto the surfaces of envelopes whose shininess camouflaged them. They 
were hidden in love letters, business communications, under stamps etc.
1 .4  Steg an o g rap h y on Com p uter
Nowadays there is much communication between peoples and organisations through the 
use of the phone, the fax, computer communications, radio etc. All of this communication
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should be secure. The person for whom a mail message was intended should be the only 
person who can, and should read that message.
To achieve this privacy one has to employ the techniques of cryptography and
steganography. With cryptography there is always the possibility o f cracking the code. 
With steganography there is the possibility that the existence of secret information in the 
writing or image could be discovered. By encrypting the secret information first and then 
concealing its very presence we combine the advantages of both methods.
On computer systems there are many different realms where secrecy is necessary. For 
example electronic mail, communication across WANs and LANs ( eg to database servers 
from client applications ), data storage of sensitive information etc.
If there are vast quantities of information to be kept secret there is no point in trying to 
hide this information using steganography. The main use o f steganography on computer
systems is in the sending of short messages that need to be secure.
On computer systems there are a lot of examples of random looking data. For example 
data on un formated disks, executable files, graphical image files, encrypted data, 
compressed data, sound and audio files etc. It is this randomness that can be exploited to 
conceal the presence of a message. If a cryptanalyst is monitoring communications from 
an organisation he could very well disregard random looking data on the communications 
line.
If data appears random and adding information into this data does not change the 




Review of Computer based Steganography.
2 .1 A va ila b le  Steg an o g rap h ic Software
In this section we review some software8 that hides information in graphical images and 
by other computer based data files. Most of the image based software reviewed uses the 
same basic technique, that o f replacing the least significant bit of pixel colour information 
with the steganographic data. There are other methods reviewed that use the same basic 
idea. We are particularly interested in the image based methods.
The data in an image is very random. A given byte of data in an image describes the 
colour of a pixel or several pixels. This byte can contain any value. That implies 
randomness.
In a given image there may be sections of it that are of a similar colour. A human viewer 
of this image would not notice a very slight change in colour from one pixel to the next, 
for example a very slightly different shade of blue. This different shade of blue is 
produced by manipulating the least significant bit. This slight variation in colour can only 
be determined by computer analysis.
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2.1.1 M andelSteg by H enry H astur
MandelSteg stands for Mandelbrot Steganography. It generates a Mandelbrot fractal, 
injects secret information into it and generates a GIF file for the resulting image.
The package consists of two executables Mandelsteg to create the fractal and hide the 
information. Gifextract to extract the secret information from the fractal.
For the lowest security level, the data will simply be stored in the specified bit of each 
pixel, and a 128-colour palette created such that the pixels look the same regardless of 
whether there is data stored in them or not. This will be sufficient to survive a cursory 
examination, but will be obvious to anyone versed in the arts of steganography. In 
particular replacing the supplied palette for the image with another will show up the data 
bits hidden in areas of solid colour.
To avoid this problem, one should specify the -ns flag, which will only store data in areas 
of non-solid colour (note that this can greatly decrease the amount of data that you can 
store in the image).
If there is not enough space for the data in the image, one can simply increase the size of 
the image by using the -sz flag, followed by the width and height in pixels. Alternatively, 
one can select a different area of the mandelbrot set by using -md followed by the start x, 
start y, width and height, specified with floating-point values.
GIFExtract is the program which is used to extract the specified bitplane from an image 
and sends the data to stdout. The program defaults to extracting bit 7 of each pixel, but 
the bit can be specified with the -b command line option, with -ns it will only extract data 
from non-solid areas, -bp can be used to ignore the first specified number of bytes 
extracted, and -a to analyse the distribution of zero and one bits in the image.
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2.1.2 Steg by the JPEG Group
Steg compresses image files using the JFIF format of the JPEG standard and in the 
process hides steganographic information into the resulting compressed file. This 
information can be retrieved through the decompression process.
The JPEG Group have produced two executables cjpeg which compresses image files 
using the JPEG standard and djpeg which decompresses a JPEG file. These two 
executables are used when hiding and revealing the secret information.
JPEG encoding is split into lossy and non-lossy stages. The lossy stages use a discrete 
cosine transform and a quantisation step to compress the image data; the non-lossy stage 
then uses Huffmann coding to further compress the image data.
The JPEG encoding procedure divides an image into 8x8 blocks of pixels. These blocks 
are run through a discrete cosine transform (DCT), and the resulting frequency 
coefficients are scaled to remove the ones, which a human viewer would not detect under 
normal conditions. If steganographic data is being loaded into the JPEG image, the 
loading occurs after this step. The lowest-order bits of all non-zero frequency coefficients 
are replaced with successive bits from the steganographic source file and these modified 
coefficients are sent to the Huffmann coder.
The resulting format is designed to make the steganographic data as innocuous as 
possible. There is no magic cookie at the start giving the format. There is however a 
length field at the beginning of the data. An EOF tag is infeasible because the EOF tag 
that one used could be part of the supplied data.
2.1.3 S-tools by A ndrew  Brown
S-Tools (Steganography Tools) gives one the capability of hiding information within 
Windows sound files (.WAV).
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Sound samples are, by their very nature, inaccurate estimates of the correct value of the 
sound wave at a particular moment in time. The sound samples in Windows WAV files 
are stored as either 8 or 16 bit values that eventually get passed to the sound board.
S-Tools spreads the bit-pattem that corresponds to the file that you want to hide across 
the least significant bits o f the sound sample. The values of the sound samples are 
changed by, at most, one value either way. This will be inaudible to the human ear.
2.1.4 G zip by A ndrew  Brown.
Gzip is a lossless file compression utility. Two executables are provided gzip and gunzip 
for the compression and decompression of files. Steganography can be obtained by 
selecting options on the command line of the two executables.
Gzip uses LZ77 which compresses data by storing length/offset pairs that refer back in 
the uncompressed data stream to previous occurrences of the information being 
compressed. Gzip considers a length of 3 to be the shortest acceptable length.
If the length is at least 5 then 1 is subtracted, and bit 0 is set to the value of the bit that we 
need to hide. We have now hidden information in the length without pushing it beyond a 
valid value.
2.1.5 Stego by R om ana M achado
Stego is a tool that hides data in, and retrieves data from, Macintosh PICT format files, 
without changing the appearance or size of the PICT file.
Stego hides data into the least significant bit (or LSB) of each of the RGB colour values. 
Stego inserts the data to be hidden in sequential order into the PICT file.
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The length of the data file is hidden in the LSB's of the first 32 useable bytes. To disguise 
this value the second to least significant bits, o f the second 32 useable bytes are XORed 
with the 32 bit file length. Then the XORed file length is hidden into the LSB's of the 
first 32 useable bytes.
2.1.6 H ideSeek by Colin M aroney
The HideSeek package consists of two executables. They allow data hiding and retrieval 
from GIF files.
There is some required header information that is stored into the gif file. This header 
information is encrypted and stored into the gif.
Hideseek uses the Least Significant Bit of each pixel to encode characters. It uses 
dispersion in a random manner to spread the data throughout the GIF.
2 .2  Steg ano graphy for Identification of Com puter based  
Inform ation
In this section we describe some research areas that are current in Steganography9. Most 
research at the moment in is the area of document marking for identification purposes. 
The goals of this research is to discourage illicit distribution of documents and 
information by embedding a identification mark with the document or information. We 
will discuss some published material in this area that is of interest to this thesis.
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2.2.1 H idden Im age C opyright L abelling
These papers10 11 12 describe a method for identifying the ownership and distribution of 
multimedia information (image or video data) in digital networked environments. The 
method involves inserting a copyright label into the multimedia information. Video 
steganography is also addressed in the papers1314.
We will describe the objectives of the authors and an introduction to the method itself. 
The label as described is steganographic data, and we will refer to it as such in our 
discussion.
The authors want the copyright label to be a reliable property identification tool so they 
impose the following requirements on the system:-
• The image must contain the copyright mark.
• The image data is labelled in a manner which allows its distribution to be tracked.
• The code must be visually and statistically camouflaged.
This method assumes that the main purpose of any attack would be to make the 
embedded label unverifiable. A forger should not be able to produce a valid copyright 
code. A forger should not be able to identify the label in an image.
The system must also be robust enough to withstand normal image processing activities 
which do not significantly alter the images appearance or affect its value. For example 
image compression, transforming to a different format etc.
The method described is called SysCoP (System for Copyright Protection). It is based on 
the fact that natural images are tolerant of noise. This means that controlled loss of 
information in an image is hardly noticeable, even if the altered image is compared with 
the original image. Given these facts the method described is based on the lossy image 
compression method JPEG15.
The method involves two phases
2 0
• The first phase takes as input the copyright code and produces a random sequence of 
locations for embedding the code in the image.
• The second phase actually embeds the steganographic data into the image at the 
specified locations. It does this by
1. Using the location information to determine a block in the image.
2. It compresses the block using JPEG techniques. It then determines where in the 
compressed block information loss is acceptable16. This step produces a quantised 
signal which represents the image block. The method modifies some of the low order 
frequency components of the DCT representation of an image block. These 
modifications are such that they are not noticed by the viewer.
3. It then embeds the steganographic data into the JPEG signal at the determined 
locations.
4. The quantised data is then decoded; and inversely transformed to produce the labelled 
image data.
This method uses JPEG to give a representation of an image file, it then embeds the
steganographic data into this representation, and then decodes the representation back to a
new image file.
JPEG was chosen because:-
• It allows direct access to frequency bands in the image. This allows the label data to 
be inserted in a manner in which it is visually camouflaged.
• JPEG also identifies high frequency components in the image and allows them to be 
more coarsely quantised. Hiding the steganographic in these components makes the 
label robust to normal image processing activities.
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2.2.2 Identification Techniques to D iscourage D ocum ent C opying
In these papers1718 the authors describe a set of novel steganographic methods to secretly 
embed robust labels into documents. The purpose of the method is for the identification 
of the copyright holder and original distributor.
We will describe the objectives of the authors and an introduction to the method itself. 
The authors propose techniques that discourage illicit distribution o f documents by 
embedding each document with a unique codeword.
The method has the objectives of discouraging illicit dissemination of documents 
distributed by computer network and to make paper copies of documents traceable. The 
coding methods developed involve altering features of the text in documents. The major 
goal described in the papers is to design coding methods, that are reliably decodeable ( 
even in the presence of noise) yet are largely indiscernible to the reader.
The authors propose three coding methods and describe one in detail, and present 
experimental results which show that the identification techniques are highly reliable.
The document marking is achieved by altering the text formatting, or by altering certain 
characteristics of textual elements (e.g. characters).
2.2.2.1 Line-Shift Coding
This is a method of altering a document by vertically shifting locations of text lines to 
encode the document uniquely. Each codeword specifies a set of text lines to be moved in 
the document. This encoding may be applied either to a format file (e.g. PostScript file) 
or to a bitmap of a page image. Decoding does not require the original document.
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2 2 . 2 . 2  W ord -S h ift C od in g
This is a coding method that is applied either to a format file or to a bitmap image of a 
document. This is a method o f altering a document by horizontally shifting the locations 
o f words within text lines. The method is only applicable to documents with variable
spacing between adjacent words. Because o f the variable spacing, decoding requires the
original image. This is to give the spacing between words in the original document.
2.2.2.3 Feature Coding
This is a coding method that is applied either to a format file or to a bitmap image of a 
document. The image is examined for chosen text features, and those features are altered, 
or not altered, depending on the codeword. Decoding requires the original image, or more 
specifically, a specification of the change in pixels at a feature. There are many possible 
choices of text features. For example alter upward vertical endlines. That is the tops of the 
letters, b, d, h etc. The endlines are altered by extending or shortening their lengths by 
one (or more) pixels.
2.3 A lternative M ethods of Steg an o g rap h y on Com puter
There are many other possible alternatives for applying steganography to computer 
related information. For example data has been hidden into the following:-
• Between the various layers of the OSI network model19.
• ISDN speech data20.
• Sound media for example, compact disks etc21.
We describe one technique we investigated in this section.
A PC disk can contain bad sectors. These sectors are marked as unusable in the FAT ( 
File Allocation Table ). The data in an unformated disk is very random and is different
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from disk to disk. A steganographic application could be developed that would describe 
some sectors that are readable as bad in the FAT and use these to hold the sensitive 
information.
The information could be encrypted before insertion. Encrypted data is by its nature 
random so this would give us two means of security. First steganography is being applied 
as we have hidden random information in a location that should have arbitrary data. 
Secondly if  the steganography was discovered the encryption process gives another layer 
o f protection.
There are a numerous other ways to implement steganography using floppy disks as a 
basis. For example another way would be to use the space left on the disk when a file gets 
deleted. We could use the blocks of a deleted executable file and hide our information in 





Introduction to Fractal Image Compression.
In this chapter we give an introduction to fractal image compression. This chapter is 
based on the work of Yuval Fisher22. We will describe the quadtree fractal image 
compression method which is used as the basis o f the data hiding algorithm.
3 .1  W hat is  a fra c ta l?
A fractal is an image with infinite detail. A fractal is described by a set o f transformations 
on a set of real numbers.
3.2  W hat is  Fractal Im age C o m p re s s io n ?
Figure I shows an initial image being reproduced to 1/3 its size and translated. Three of 
these reproduced images are combined to produce a new image. This process is repeated 
6 times.
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Figure 1. Sierpinki triangle from
Figure 2 shows the same process applied to a different start image. The final image in 
both figures is identical we call this image the attractor.
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Figure 2. Sierpinki triangle from A
Thus, the initial image does not effect the final attractor. In fact, it is only the position and 
the orientation of the copies that determines what the final image will look like.
Since it is the way the input image is transformed that determines the final result of this 
process, we only describe these transformations. Different transformations lead to 
different attractors, with the technical limitation that the transformations must be 
contractive. That is, a given transformation when applied to any two points in the input 
image must bring them closer together in the copy. Except for this condition, the 
transformations can have any form. In practice, choosing transformations of the form
X -cTa X1 ei= +y_ 1 1 _y_ J i _
is sufficient. Such transformations are called affine transformations of a plane. An affine 
transformation can skew, stretch, rotate, scale and translate an input image.
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For example the following set of affine transformations generate the Sierpinki triangle. 
There are three affine transformations required to generate the triangle23. The Sierpinki 
triangle is the final attractor in figures 1 and 2. The transformations are listed in table 1 as 
1,2,3 and the values for a,b,c,d,e,f are given.
w a b c d e f
1 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0
2 0.5 0 0 0.5 50 0
3 0.5 0 0 0.5 25 50
Table 1. Transformations for Sierpinki triangle
The images in Figure 1 and Figure 2 are generated using the affine transformations in 
Table 1. A common feature of these and all attractors formed this way is that in the 
position of each of the images of the original square on the left there is a transformed 
copy of the whole image. Thus, each image is formed from transformed (and reduced) 
copies of itself, and hence it must have detail at every scale. That is, the images are 
fractals. This method of generating fractals is due to John Hutchinson24, and more 
information about many ways to generate such fractals can be found in books by 
Barnsley25 and Peitgen, Saupe, and Jurgens26.
Barnsley27 suggested that perhaps storing images as collections of transformations could 
lead to image compression. His argument went as follows: the triangle in figure 2, is 
generated from only three affine transformation. Each affine transformation is defined by 
6 numbers, which would take 768 bits to store on computer. Storing the image of the 
triangle as a collection of pixels, however, requires much more memory . So if  we wish to 
store a picture of a triangle, then we can do it by storing the numbers that define the affine 
transformations and simply generate the triangle when ever we want to see it.
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Now suppose that we were given any arbitrary image, say a face. If a small number of 
affine transformations could generate that face, then it too could be stored compactly. 
Fractal image compression is a method for finding these transformations.
3.2.1 Iterated Function Systems
The process that built figures 1 and 2 is described mathematically by an iterated function 
system (IFS). An iterated function system consists of a collection of contractive 
transformations
2 2 {wi : R -> R | i = 1,......,n}
which maps the plane R to itself. The collection of transformations defines a map
W(,)  =  \ J w , ( . )
¡=1
The transformations w; are in the same form as in table 1. That is they contain position, 
scaling, stretching skewing and rotation factors. Given an input set S, we can compute 
w j(S) for each i, take the union of these sets, and get a new set W(S). W is a map on the 
space of subsets of the plane. We will call a subset of the plane an image.
When the w j are contractive in the plane, then W  is contractive in a space of subsets of the 
plane. These subsets have to be closed and bounded; that is an image is bound by its 
dimensions28.
In order to determine if W is contractive we need a means of determining distance 
between two sets. There is such a means, called the Hausdorff metric, which measures the 
difference between two closed and bounded subsets of the plane, and in this metric W is 
contractive on the space of closed and bounded subsets of the plane.
The contractive mapping fixed point theorem29, which tells us that a map W will have a 
unique fixed point in the space of all images. That is, whatever image (or set) we start 
with, we can repeatedly apply W to it and we will converge to a fixed image. In other 
words, given an input image f(j we can apply W once g e t / ;  = W(fg), twice to get f2 = 
A$l) = M M )  — J°^(S(j) and so on. The superscript “o” indicates that we are talking
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about iterations, not exponents. The attractor which is the result of applying this a number 
of times, is the limit set
on|JF|=Soo= Urn W (So) n—>co
which is not dependent on the choice of Sg-
3.3 S e lf- Sim ilarity in Im ages
Given an image, the objective of fractal image compression is to find an IFS which when 
applied to any starting image will produce the given image. In this section we will show 
how an IFS is found for a given input image.
3.3.1 An Image as a Mathem atical Function
When we wish to refer to an image, we refer to the function f(x,y) which gives the grey 
level at each point (x,y). This is our model of an image. The function/ gives us a z value 
for each x,y position and so defines a surface in 3D space. For simplicity, we assume we 
are dealing with square images of size 1. That is,
(x,y) e { O ,v ) :0  < u , v < l }  = I 2, and f (x ,y )  e l  = [0,1].
/m eans the interval [0 , 1] and / 2is the unit square.
3.3.2 A  M etric on Images.
A metric is a function that measures distance. We want to find a map W which takes an 
input image and yields an output image. We want to know when W is contractive so we 
have to define a distance between two images. That is the distance between fg  and f]
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where f]  = W(fo). There are many metrics to choose from, but we will use the RMS (root 
mean square) metric
This metric gives us the distances between two images f(x,y) and g(x,y), and in the 
process allows us calculate the components of a transformation for transforming g(x,y) 
into f(x,y).
3.3.3 Self-Sim ilarity in Natural images
A typical image of a face, does not contain the type of self-similarity that can be found in 
the fractals of figure 2. A face does contain a different sort of self-similarity. For example 
the left side of a persons jaw  is similar (after transformation) to the right side.
The distinction from the kind of self-similarity we saw in figure 2, is that rather than 
having the image formed of copies of its whole self, here the image will be formed of 
copies of transformed parts o f itself. These transformed parts do not fit together, to form 
an exact copy of the original image.
As before, the definition of a PIFS is not dependent on the type of transformations that 
are used. Again they are affine transformations. The grey level adds another dimension, 
so the transformations w/ are o f the form,
( 1 )
3.4 Partitioned Iterated Function S y ste m s
In this section we extend the notion of the IFS to a PIFS which is used to copy grey scale 
images.
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X ~a , b, O ' X
w , y = Ci d, 0 y + f
z 0 0 s f . z - ° i .
where sf controls the scaling and oj the translation o f the transformation. The s; and o; 
factors are applied to the z component of the pixel.





c ■ a_ i  i_ y_ f t .
The v/ has the same form as in table 1 and so is an IF S. Since an image is modelled as a 
function f(x,y), we can apply wj to an image /b y
w ,(f) = w i(x,y,f(x,y)).
A PIFS selects a portion of the original, which we denote by Dj and copies that part to a 
part of the produced copy which is denoted Rj. We denote this transformation by Wj. The 
PIFS is applied in feedback loop; its own output is fed back as its new input again and 
again.
Now Vj determines how the partitioned pieces of an original are mapped to the copy, 
while sj and oj determine the scaling and offset of the transformation. This means that 
vi(Dj)=Rr Each wj applies only to the part of the image that is above the domain D\. 
Mathematically each w{ is restricted to D-y.1, which is the volume with D, as its base and 
height as f(xhy ]),...J(xn,y n) where (xD,yn) e  D-t.
Figure 3 shows a D\ and a R\. A representation of D\ is shown as a circle; this in general 
would not be the case. A representation for the surface over D\ is shown as the connected 
lines in the left hand diagram. These represent the pixel levels at some points in the Dj.
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The representation of Rj is again shown as a circle and the surface over Rj is shown as a 
circle. Therefore the volume of 3D space with Rj as a circle and the surface as a circle is 
the cylinder shown. The surface o f the image over Rj would in general be a connected set 
of line segments. The full surface of the image is /  and Rjxl is a volume with Rj as its 
base and [0,1] as its height. So mathematically the piece o f the image over Rj is 
/  n  (R, x I) .
The transformation w[(j) is shown as mapping the pixel values in D\ to the pixel values in 
R\. The mapping v/ is a mapping of Dj to Rj in the x-y plane. The factors sj and Of in wj 
act on the z axis.
Volume above D y  Showing the Volume above R ¡. Showing the
z co-ordinates of some points in D r  z co-ordinates o f some points in R-,.
This graph indicates that/  
applied to all points in ( R J  
result in the same grey level.
Then R {x l  is the column shown. 
Also the circle at the top of the 
cylinder is the intersection of 
R^ x] with f.
Figure 3. Domain to Range
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3.4.1 Fixed points for PIFS
Since the metric we chose in equation 1 is only sensitive to what happens in the z 
direction, it is not necessary to impose contractivity conditions in the x or y  directions. 
The transformation W will be contractive when each S;< 1 . That is, when z distances are 
shrunk by a factor less than 1 .
3.5  E n co d in g  Im ages
In this section we will use the above theory and develop it into a method for encoding and 
decoding images.
Let the collection of domains D\ be referred to as the domain library D.
Suppose we are given an im age/tha t we wish to encode. That is, we w a n t/b e  the fixed 
point of applying the following
/  =  W(J) = w, ( / )  u  w2 ( / )  U ... WN ( / )
That is, we seek a transformation W whose fixed point f'= \W \ is close to, or looks like 
/ .  In that case,
/  *  / '  = W (f')  *  W (f) = wi( f ) u w 2(f)u ...w M( f )
We can determine that/ '  is close to /  when drms(f, / ' )  is small. It is sufficient to 
approximate the parts o f the image with transformed pieces. We do this by minimising 
the following quantities
dm ( f n ( R , x  / ) , » , ( / ) )  (3)
34
H e re /is  the surface which represents the whole image, (i?,x7) is the vertical space above 
R{. Therefore /  n  (R x / )  is the part o f the image over Rr Since each Wj is restricted to 
the image over Z)„ and w-t maps the image above Dj to the image above Rj. Therefore w{(J) 
is the transformed part of the image over Dj.
That is we find pieces Dj and maps wj, so that when we apply a wf to the part of the 
image over Dj, we get something that looks like the image over Rj.
Given two squares containing n pixel intensities, a],...,an (from Dj) and bj,...,bn (from R{ 
), and given an R, we wish to find a Dx for which the RMS metric is a minimum
The RMS metric seeks to find a Dj ( we search all domains in D )  whose pixel gray scale 
values most match the Rj. In equation 2, the z values are only affected by the scaling 
factor sj and offset factor oj. Therefore given two squares containing n pixel intensities aj 
,....,an from Dj and bj,....,bn from R{ we multiply the ai ,....,an by Sj and add oj to the 
result.
The sj and oj are constant for a Dj so we will refer to them as s and o. We will first of all 
evaluate a mean square distance metric. The root mean squared metric is the square root 
of this30. We therefore seek s and o to minimise the quantity
n
d„,s = H ( s -ai + °~b,)21=1
This will give us scaling and offset factors that make the transformed aj values have the 
least squared distance from the bj values. The minimum of dms occurs when the partial 
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3.6 Q uadtree Partitioning
This is the fractal image compression method that is used in this thesis. A quadtree 
partition is a representation o f an image as a tree data structure in which each node, 
corresponds to a square portion of the image. The range blocks in a Quadtree partition are 
obtained by splitting the image into 4 equal sized sub-squares. These sub-squares are each 
broken into 4 other sub-squares see figure 4. The process continues until each square is of 
minimum size.
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Figure 4. Quadtree partition
Then a range block is compared with all domain blocks that are twice the size of the 
range blocks. The comparison here involves applying the RMS metric to the range block 
and an averaged domain block. The averaged domain block is calculated by grouping 4 
pixels together and getting their average. The domain block is now the same size as the 
range block. If  the range block cannot be covered by a domain block it is split into 4 sub­
squares. The process is then repeated for each of the 4 sub-squares.
Instead of comparing a range block with all domain blocks a classification31 can be used 
to decide which domain blocks are most likely to be similar to the range block.
The Quadtree method of image compression is in two parts. First the image is 
compressed to a transformation file. The transformation file can then be decompressed to 
reproduce an approximation to the original image file.
The following algorithm for encoding images based on this idea is used in this thesis. The 
encoding algorithm proceeds as follows32:-
• Choose for the collection D of permissible domains all the sub-squares in the image 
o f size 16, 32, 48. These domains are overlapping.
• Build up the ranges which are non-overlapping. Each range is a square sub-image. We 
do this by partitioning the image recursively until each range is o f a minimum size for 
example 32.
• Loop
• For each uncovered square in the quadtree partition R j , attempt to cover it by 
a domain that is larger; this makes the vj contractive.
• If  a predetermined tolerance RMS value E is met, then
call the square Rj and the covering domain D\ . Mark the R[ as covered. 
Write out the transformation.
Else
subdivide the square and repeat.
• End Loop
The following algorithm for decoding images based on this idea is implemented in this 
thesis The decoding algorithm proceeds as follows:-
• Starting with any initial image.
• Read in all the w{s.
• Loop
• For each w. find the domain D\
• apply vf to transform the domain to its range.
• multiply each pixel value by s\ and add o\ to the result.
• Put the resulting pixels in the position of the R\.




Least Squares Polynomial Approximation.
We know that the relationship between the domain block and a modified range block is a 
linear one. That is in building the new range block
• We have matched a range block to a domain block using the RMS metric to a 
specified tolerance level.
• We have obtained a scaling factor s and offset factor o from the RMS metric.
• Multiply each pixel in the domain block by the scaling factor and adding the offset 
factor to produce a pixel in the new range block.
That is if  yj,y2, ■■> yn are pixels in the new range block and xj, x j ? xn are pixels of 
the domain block then each >7 is formed by
yi =xj*s+o
On retrieval of the steganographic data we need to determine if  a match occurs between a 
given range and a domain block. This match is the discovery that the linear relationship 
as described above exists between the two blocks. However we do not have an exact 
linear relationship because we have to store an integer approximation to the real result of 
the above equation. So we only store an approximation to the variable yj in the 
steganographic image file.
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However in a multimedia environment the relationship may be even more non-linear. For 
example if  the steganographic image is subjected to JPEG compression followed by 
decompression then the pixels of both the domain and range blocks would have been 
modified. This modification is such that it should still be possible to determine that a 
linear relationship exists between the two blocks to some probability. The method we 
choose is the Least Squares Method of line fitting.
We choose Least Squares because it allows the calculation of a equation of the form
y = M*x+C
for any two given sets of data. The two sets of data in this case are pixels from the 
domain block ( x in the equation) and pixels from the range block (y in the equation). We 
use the correlation coefficient statistic to determine how good this equation fits the data. 
If we have a good fit then we have found the linear relationship and hence a match.
4 .1 The Method of Le a st S q u a re s
Very often in practice a relationship is found to exist between two (or more) variables, 
and one wishes to express this relationship in mathematical form by determining an 
equation connecting the variables.
• The first step is the collection of data showing corresponding values of the variables x 
and y.
• The next step is to plot the points (xj,yj), (x2,y2>, ■■■>(xn>yn)- The resulting set of 
points is sometimes called a scatter diagram33.
From the scatter diagram it is often possible to visualise a smooth curve approximating 
the data. Such a curve is called an approximating curve. In Fig 5, for example, the data 
appears to be approximated well by a straight line, and we say that a linear relationship
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exists between the variables. We may also get non linear relationships and no 
relationships at all.
The general problem of finding equations o f approximating curves which fit given sets of 
data is called curve fitting. In practice the type of equation is often suggested from the 
scatter diagram. The basic approach in practice is usually the same: You choose a 
mathematical model for the data with a particular choice of parameters.
Data in general is not exact. The data is subject to errors (or noise). Thus, typical data 
never exactly fits the model that is being used, even when the model is correct. We need a 
means of assessing how good the fit of the model is to the data. We need to test the 
goodness-of-fit$4 against some useful statistical standard.
4.2 L e a st S q u a re s in R etrieval of steg an o g rap h ic inform ation




FigureS. Linear Regression Curve
For a given value of x, say xj  there is an error (or noise) in the signal we represent this 
error as dj. This difference is referred to as a deviation error or residual and may be
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positive, negative or zero. Similarly, corresponding to the values X2,...^n we obtain 
deviations d2 ,...,dn.
A measure of the goodness of fit of the curve C to the set of data is provided by the 
quantity
d]2+d2^+ ....+dn2 
if  this quantity is small the fit is good, if  it is large the fit is bad.
The reason we square the deviations is because if  we added them they would cancel each 
other out. On the other hand the modulus35 is very complex to deal with.
Of all curves approximating a given set of data points, the curve having the property that
d]2 +d2 ^+ ,...+dn2 = a minimum
is the best-fitting curve.
Thus a line having this property is called a least-squares line.
Here we are saying that x is an independent variable and y is the dependent variable. 
However in a multimedia environment both x and y  will be subject to error of 
approximately equal amounts. Therefore we may consider minimising the sum of the 
squares of the perpendicular distances.





d]2 -  (yi - Mxj - B)2
So, the sum of the squares is
5  =  Z O ' /  “  Mx< ~ BYi=i
So we need to find M and B for which S is a minimum this will give us the least-squares 
line. That is we find the minimum with respect to M and B.
and
dM /=!
We follow the standard minimum-finding course and set derivatives to zero. 
Rewriting we have
N • B +
M=i '  i=i
and
( „ \ ( » } n
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4.3 Determ ining a G o o d n e ss  of fit
In order to determine if the fit of the least-squares line to the data is good or not. We look 
at statistics theory.
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If X],X2,...,Xn denote the random variables of a sample of size n, then the random 
variable giving the variance o f the sample or the sample variance$7 is defined as
( x . - x f +( x 2 - x ) \  + ( * „ - I )2
— n
where X  is the mean of the sample or the sample mean
~  _  Xj + X 2+.....+X„
n
The covariance38 of two random variables X  and Y is defined as
i ( x , - x ) . { r , - Ÿ )
--------------------------------------------n
The sample variances and covariance of x and>' are given by:- 
the variance of x is
4.3.1 Sample Variances Covariance and Correlation Coefficient
n «
Z ( x' ~ x)
and variance o f y  is
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and the covariance of x and y  is
_  1=1 ö xy -
Ì L ( x ' - x ) * ( y > - y )
n
Then the sample correlation coefficient39 is given by
SxSy
4*3.2 Standard Error of Estimate
If we let yeS( denote the estimated value of y  for a given value o f x, as obtained from the 
regression curve of y  on x, then a measure of the scatter about the regression curve is 
given by
s .x.y -  \
Z U '  - > a t Y  (=1
n
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We can now express SyX for the least-squares line in terms of the variance and 
correlation coefficient as
4.3.3 T he L inear C orrelation C oefficient
From the definitions of S y X  and S y  we have
y  est)
r2 = 1 -& --------------n o
n » - y f
1=1
4 7
This can be expressed as
¿ ( y « f  - y f
r 2 = — -----------------
£ ( > f - 5 ) 2
1=1
Thus can be interpreted as the fraction of the total variation which is explained by the 
least-squares regression line. That is, r measures how well the least-squares regression 
line fits the sample data. If the total variation is all explained by the regression line, that is 
when r-2 = 1, we say that there is a perfect linear correlation. On the other hand if  the total 
variation is all unexplained then r — 0 .
That is
r = (Explained Variation)/(Total Variation).
In practice the quantity r, lies between 0 and 1.
For a linear least-square line we will use the following formula
;=1  ^i=l '   ^;'=1 'r = ; \
This equation will give rounding errors due to the small valued floating point data. 
However in practice we found that these rounding errors are insignificant to our 
algorithm.
n • ;=i -;=i I *i=i ■ 7=1
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4.4 The Retrieval algorithm  with least sq u a re s
On retrieval of the steganographic data we need to determine if  match exists between a 
modified range block and an associated domain block. On data hiding we have modified a 
range block by using the pixels of an associated domain block. On retrieval we basically 
need to find a correlation between the two blocks. The correlation is a linear relationship. 
If  we can find this linear relationship between a range block and a domain block we say a 
match has occurred. This match is confirmed as follows:-
•  For a given range block we select a block from the domain library.
• We calculate the linear correlation coefficient r between the two blocks.
• If r is greater than some minimum level then we say a match has occurrcd. If the 






5 .1 The D iscrete C o s in e  Transform  (D CT)
The DCT41 is in a class of mathematical operations that includes the Fast Fourier 
Transform (FFT). The basic operation performed by these transforms is to take a signal 
and transform it from one type of representation to another.
The FFT is used when analysing digital audio samples. In this case we collect a set of 
sample points form an incoming audio signal. We end up with a collection of points 
which show the voltage level at each point in time. That is the x-axis is the time and the y 
axis is the amplitude. The FFT transforms the set of sample points into a set of frequency 
values that describe exactly the same signal. After processing the x-axis is the frequency 
and the Y axis is the magnitude of that frequency.
The DCT takes a set of points from the spatial domain and transforms them into an 
identical representation in the frequency domain. The DCT operates on a three 
dimensional signal X,Y and Z. In this case the signal is a graphical image. The X and Y 
axes are the two dimensions of the image. The amplitude of the signal in this case is 
simply the value of a pixel in the image. This is the spatial representation of the signal.
The DCT is used to convert spatial information into frequency or spectral information. 
The X and Y axis represents the frequencies of the signal in two different dimensions.
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There is an Inverse DCT (IDCT) function that can convert the spectral representation of 
the signal back to the spatial one.
The DCT is performed on an N x N square matrix of pixels values, and it yields an N x N 
matrix of frequency coefficients. The formula for the DCT is
DCT(ij) -  C( i ) C( j ) £ , £ p i x e l ( x , y ) C O s ( C O s (
C(x) = — if  x is 0, else 1 if  x > 0V2
The formula for the inverse DCT transform (IDCT) is
Pixel(x,y) =  ^ ^ ^ C ( i ) C U ) D C T ( i J ) C 0 ^ 2 x^ l^ C 0 4 ^ 2 y^ lTi]
C(x) = —¡= if  x is 0, else 1 if  x > 0V 2
In the DCT N x N matrix, all elements in row 0 have a frequency component of zero in 
one direction of the signal. All elements in column 0 have a frequency component of zero 
in the other direction. As rows and columns move away from the origin, the coefficients 
in the transformed DCT matrix begin to represent higher frequencies.
Most graphical images are composed of low-frequency information. It turns out that the 
components found in row and column 0  carry more useful information about the image 
than the higher-frequency components.
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So the DCT transformation identifies pieces of information in the signal that can be 






For this thesis we designed an algorithm which allows a user to insert steganographic data 
into image files.
In this section we discuss our algorithm which is specific to the quadtree fractal image 
compression method. However almost any of fractal image compression method42 could 
have been used.
The data hiding algorithm exploits the noise43 in an image. An objective of the method is 
that the modified parts of the steganographic image file will contain the same level of 
noise as in the surrounding areas.
If a noise filtering algorithm44 has been applied to an image then this image is not suitable 
for data hiding. This is because introduced noise by our algorithm would be clearly 
visible.
6.2 The hiding ste g an o g rap h ic  data algorithm
• The image file is copied to produce a new image file which we refer to as the 
steganographic image file.
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• The user graphically selects two non-overlapping areas of the image. One is known as 
the range region the other is known as the domain region. These areas of the image 
form the visual key. We refer to sub-images within the range region as range blocks. 
We refer to sub-images within the domain region as domain blocks.
• Blocks in the range region are modified. Blocks in the domain region are used in 
modifying the range blocks.
• We refer to the set of domain blocks as the domain library.
• A domain library45 is built from a set of blocks in the domain region. The domain 
library is split into two halves.
• Fractal image compression theory is used to identify a series of range blocks, and a 
corresponding series of matching domain blocks46. The matching process produces for 
each range block, the best matching domain block and a corresponding fractal 
transform. We may be unable to find a good match for some range blocks.
• If a good match is found the algorithm produces a new range block which is most 
visually like the original range block. This new range block is stored in the position of 
the original block in the steganographic image file.
• The algorithm selects a suitable range block, and then for each domain block in the 
selected half of the domain library determines a fractal transform.
• If the current bit of steganographic data is a 0, we search for a match in the first half of 
the domain library, otherwise we search the second half.
• The fractal transform basically involves multiplying a pixe,l in the selected domain 
block, by an average scaling factor and adding an offset factor to the result. This 
calculation produces a corresponding pixel in the new range block. The pixel value 
stored is an integer approximation.
• The fractal transform is applied to the domain block, to produce a new range block that 
is visually like the original range block. This new block is written to the 
steganographic image, in place of the old range block.
• Hiding the steganographic data involves producing a new range block, in the manner 
described for each bit of steganographic data.
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6.3 The retrieving ste g an o g rap h ic data algorithm
• The retrieving steganographic data algorithm is the reverse of the hiding.
• In retrieving the user specifies the position of the range and the domain regions. These 
form the visual key.
• The domain library is built from a set of blocks in the domain region. The domain 
library is split into two halves.
• To find a bit of steganographic data in the steganographic image file we select a range 
block from the range region in the same order as in the hiding algorithm and find a 
corresponding domain block that matches it by a linear relationship.
• The linear relationship is determined by calculating the least squares coefficient 
between the domain and range blocks.
• If the match occurred with a domain block in the first half of the library then a zero bit 
is retrieved otherwise a one bit is retrieved.
6.4 Theory
In this section we will describe the theory and algorithm that allows our algorithm to hide
steganographic data into images. Our algorithm is based on the quadtree fractal image
compression algorithm as described in chapter 3.
The algorithm is described based on the following assumptions, these are only to simplify
the discussion.
• We have a square grey scale image of size 256x256.
• That each byte in the image data represents a pixel whose level of grey is from 0 to
255.
• We use square shaped regions and blocks.
• The domain blocks are twice as big as the range blocks.
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The hiding algorithm takes as input and image /, and a set of steganographic data steg. 
The hiding algorithm outputs a visually identically image Inew> that has the 
steganographic data hidden in it.
The revealing algorithm takes as input an image I, and outputs a set of steganographic 
data steg.
We select two square ( square is a simplification ) parts of the image. These parts can be 
at any location in the image. One part, is used as a domain region, the other is used as the 
range region. Let the range region be Ij and the domain region be 12-
As described in chapter 3 the domain library47 is built, from a set of blocks in the domain 
region. These blocks are bigger than the range blocks. For example choose for the 
collection D of permissible domains all the sub-squares in ¡2 of size 4x4, 5x5, 6x6 . These 
domain blocks can overlap one another. The blocks are overlapping to allow more blocks 
in the domain library. All we really need for a domain block, is a collection of pixels 
taken from the domain region.
Let the domain library D be represented by the blocks {dj,d2,....,df }. Where t is the 
number of blocks in the domain library. The domain library D is split into two halves




Let R -  {r],r2 ,....,ru}.be the collection of range block. The range blocks are non­
overlapping. The range blocks cannot overlap, because these blocks are modified by the 
algorithm, and we only want to modify one block at a time. Each range block is a square 
sub-image. We determine R by partitioning I j  recursively until each range block is of a 
minimum size, for example 4x4. We now continue to partition I] until all range blocks 
are of a maximum size for example 2x2. During this process we add all range blocks of 
size 4x4 to size 2x2 to R.
Figure 7. The Range blocks in the range region.
When hiding we use the Root Mean Square metric (RMS) to determine if  the range block 
matches a domain block. While calculating the RMS metric we also calculate average
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scaling s and offset o factors. When these factors are applied to the pixels of the domain 
block they yield a new block rnew which looks like the original range block. We replace 
the original range block with rnew. Each replacing of a range block by its equivalent new 
block allows us to hide 1 bit of the steganographic data.
When retrieving we need to determine if a selected range block r\ has been replaced by a 
new block as described above. To do this we search through D and calculate the best 
correlation coefficient for the r\ with each domain block dt. A match indicates that a 1 or 
a 0 bit has been hidden for this range block.
Let {yj,y2^-^yn} represent the pixels in a range block. Let {x]jC2>-—’xn} represent the 
a v e r a g e d  pixel values in the corresponding domain block. The length of any side in a 
domain block is twice that of a range block therefore there are four times as many pixels 
in a domain block than there are in a range block. Therefore in matching we will take an 
average of four pixels in a domain block for each range block (as described in chapter 3). 
We do the averaging so that in the domain block xn is the last pixel value. Therefore the 
domain block and the range block have been made the same size.
All of the above apply to both the hiding and revealing algorithms. We will now describe 
the specifics of both algorithms.
6.4.1 The add steganographic data algorithm
We will use an example throughout this description to illustrate the workings of the 
algorithm.
Let the steganographic data steg be represented as a binary bit stream {b ¡,b2,----,bn) . Let 
n be the number of bits in the bit stream. Let CurrentBit be the current bit in the stream. 
CurrentBit has values of 0 or 1.
Let the predetermined tolerance RMS value be E; the value for E is chosen to be « 5.0, 
This value was chosen from the results of Fisher48.
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We use a set of selected range blocks represented by SelectedRanges which is initially the 
empty set { }. The hiding algorithm then selects a range block r\ from R where rj and any 
of its sub-blocks do not belong to SelectedRanges. We then add r\ and all its sub-blocks 
to SelectedRanges. For example if r\ is of size 8x8 it will be made up of 4 sub-blocks of 
size 4x4.
We now look at an example range block rh. This is a 4x4 pixel block and we show the 
pixel values in this block.
Row 1 Row 2 row 3 row 4
Column 1 49 58 35 52
Column 2 50 57 56 55
Column 3 50 62 54 55
Column 4 51 58 55 58
Table 4 The pixel values of the range block r/
We now search for a match in one of the domain Libraries Dq or Dj. If  CurrentBit is 0 
we search Do otherwise we search Dj. During this search we apply the Root Mean 
Squared(RMS) metric between r\ and a dj. We chose the block dj for which the RMS 
value is a minimum and is less than E (as described in chapter 3).
If this search is successful then
Let d founc( represent the domain block that matches the range block r\. We will use 
the example to illustrate the calculation of the RMS value.
Row 1 Row 2 row 3 row 4
Column 1 66 79 47 71
Column 2 67 76 77 77
Column 3 70 84 73 76
Column 4 68 77 76 81
Table 5 The pixel values o f the domain block dpoumi
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As described in chapter 3 to determine the RMS metric between the range and domain 
blocks we first determine s, o (the scaling and offset factors).
n i1 n
"Z  x,yi-TixiHyii=1_________ f=l M
ft ( "  ^
2 ~
" ± x ? - 2 > ,
1=I V = l
in this case « i s  16 ( the number o f pixels in the block) and each Xj is a pixel from the 
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In this case:-
0  = 2.255439438
Now the RMS metric is calculated with:-
RMS =




This RMS value is less than E. Let us assume that this RMS value is the minimum 
calculated during our search.
We build a new block rnew by applying the transformations to the pixels of the domain 
block dFound . Let {zg , z] zn) represent the pixels of rnew.
where zj = s* x\ + o
In our example we build the block rnew
Row 1 Row 2 row 3 row 4
Column 1 48.649 57.787 35.293 52.163
Column 2 49.352 55.678 56.381 56.381
Column 3 51.461 61.302 53.569 55.678
Column 4 50.055 56.381 55.678 59.193
Table 6 Values in rnew before being rounded
Because s and o are real numbers when we apply them to a pixel of the d founc[ they 
produce a real result. But we have to store an integer approximation to this real number in 
rnew- This integer approximation is based on rounding the real number to the nearest 
whole number.
Applying rounding to the pixels of rnew gives
Row 1 Row 2 row 3 row 4
Column 1 49 58 35 52
Column 2 49 56 56 56
Column 3 51 61 54 56
Column 4 50 56 56 59
Table 7 Pixels stored in rnew
We now place rnew in the appropriate position in the steganographic image file Inew.
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We now show a comparison o f the pixels of the original range block r\ and the block 
replacing it rnew.


















Table 8. Comparison of pixels in rnew and r\.
Now we show the relevant portions of the original image and the steganographic image 
file. The block r\ is marked in the original image file and the block rnew is marked in the 
steganographic image file.
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B l o c k  /•/ in 
t h e  o r i g i n a l  
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Figure 8. Original range block and its replacement
6.5 Algorithm  p se u d o  co de
Define the function Bound as
Function Boundiyal) Integer 
Begin
if ( val < 0 ) then 
return 0
else







Hide is a function which finds a matching domain block for the given range block. Hide 
will also modify the appropriate part o f lnew-'-
HideQi)
Begin
If Current Bit equals 0 then
For each domain in Dq find the domain that has the least Root Mean 
Squared Difference to /•/. Let this domain be dRMSmin anc  ^ let this RMS 
value be RMSmin.
If RMSmjn < E then
Determine ¿7,0 / for transforming dRMSrnin to ri- 
Create rnew which is the same size as r/ initially set to { }.




For each domain in D{ find the domain that has the least Root Mean 
Squared Difference to rj. Let this domain be dRMSmin anc  ^ let this RMS 
value be RMSmin.
If RMSmin < E then
Determine Sj,oj for transforming dRMSmin ri- 
Create rnew which is the same size as rj initially set to { }.




The hiding algorithm proceeds as follows
Choose for the domain library D all the sub-squares in ¡2 of size 8,10, and 16 . Average 
the pixels in each domain block so that they now have sizes of 4,5 and 8 . That is we 
average 4 pixels in I2 to make 1 pixel in a domain block.
Split D into Do and Dj.
Partition I] recursively until each range block is of size 16.
Continue to partition Ij recursively until each range block is o f size 4 and in the process 
add each range block to R.
Set SelectedRanges to { }.
Set Index = 0
Set CurrentBit to steg[Index]
Set £  to 5.0
While ( Index <N and SelectedRanges o  R)
Select a range block r\ from R.
Set RangeAndSubBlocks to {}.
Add r\ to RangeAndSubBlocks.
Add all sub-blocks of rj to RangeAndSubBlocks.
If ( RangeAndSubBlocks n  SelectedRanges = e  ) then
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Add RangeAndSubBlocks to SelectedRanges.
Hide(rj).
Increment Index.
Set CurrentBit to steg[Index\
Endif 
End While
6.5.1 The R etrieve Steganographic D ata A lgorithm
Let the steganographic data steg be represented as a binary bit stream which is initially set 
to { }.
We set corrmin the minimum match correlation coefficient to the experimental 
determined value.
We use a set of selected range blocks represented by SelectedRanges which is initially the 
empty set { }. The retrieving algorithm then selects a range block r\ from R where r\ and 
any o f its sub-blocks do not belong to SelectedRanges. We then add r\ and all its sub­
blocks to SelectedRanges. For example if  rj is o f size 8 it will be made up of 4 sub-blocks 
o f size 4.
We now search for a match in the domain libraries Dq  and Dj .  If a match occurs we set 
FoundBit to TRUE. If a match occurs in Dq  we set CurrentBit to 0 otherwise if  a match 
occurs in D]  we set CurrentBit to 1. This search involves finding a corresponding domain 
block d founci ( if any ) that has the correlation coefficient corr > corrmm. The correlation 
coefficient is calculated for each block in the domain library. The calculation of the 
correlation coefficient for a given domain and range blocks is as follows:-
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corr = /=! '  M '   ^i=l
r  - (  « 2^ ~ , « f  n \ 2
(§-) • /= ! ^  /=1
where
{x0,x,,x2,...,x„} ery
{y0, y i , y 2’- ^ y n} e d fOU„j
corr is the correlation coefficient
We will use the following example to illustrate the algorithm. We use the same domain 
block as in the hiding algorithm example.
Row I Row 2 row 3 row 4
Column 1 66 79 47 71
Column 2 67 76 77 77
Column 3 70 84 73 76
Column 4 68 77 76 81
Table 9 Domain block
We use the range block generated in the hiding algorithm example
Row 1 Row 2 row 3 row 4
Column 1 49 58 35 52
Column 2 49 56 56 56
Column 3 51 61 54 56
Column 4 50 56 56 59
Table 10 Range block
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W e calculate the  correla tion  coefficient b e tw een  th e  dom ain  and range b locks as
corr= 0.997071
which is greater that corrmin.
W e w ill n o w  detail the  algorithm :-
For each domain block in the domain library we calculate the sum of the pixels 
Dsumpixels and the sum of the square of each pixel call it Dsumsquarepixels. We store 
these values in a data structure for easy retrieval afterwards.
Function IsRangeTransformed(rj,df0und) BOOLEAN 
Begin
Let {ay;, x] , , *„} e 77
Let {yo ,y i  > ,yn) e  ¿found
Set i to 0.
Set n to number of pixels in range block
Set Rsumpixels to 0
Set Rsumsquarepixels to 0
Set sumRD to 0
Loop
Set sumRD to sumRD + x/*y/
Set Rsumpixels to Rsumpixels + xt
Set Rsumsquarepixels to Rsumsquarepixels + x/*x/
Increment /.
Until i =  n
6 9
set
n * sumrd -  Rsumpixels * Dsumpixelscow  — — — — - -. ....
- [^(w * Rsumsquarepixels -  Rsumpixels2 )*(/?* Dsumsquarepixels -  Dsumpixels2)]







Set i to 0 
Loop
Set dF0lm d  to d\ from D.
Set FoundBit to FALSE 
If (IsRangeTransformed(ri,dFound) = TRUE ) 
Set FoundBit to TRUE 
If dFound e D0 then
Set CurrentBit to 0 
Else






The retrieving algorithm proceeds as follows:-
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Choose for the domain library D all the sub-squares in I2  of size 8, 16, 32.
Average the pixels in each domain block so that they now have sizes of 4,8 and 16. That 
is we average 4 pixels in I2 to make 1 pixel in a domain block.
Split D into Dq and D j.
Partition 7/ recursively until each range block is of size 16.
Continue to partition Ij  recursively until each range block is of size 4 and in the process 
add each range block to R.
Set SelectedRanges to { }.
Set Index = 0
Set FoundBit to FALSE
While ( SelectedRanges o  R)
Select a range block r\ from R.
Set RangeAndSubBlocks to {}.
Add r\ to RangeAndSubBlocks.
Add all sub-blocks of r\ to RangeAndSubBlocks.
If ( RangeAndSubBlocks n  SelectedRanges = { } ) then 
Add RangeAndSubBlocks to SelectedRanges.
UnHide(r{).
If FoundBit = TRUE then










This chapter describes the results obtained from testing the theory of chapter 6. The 
results obtained were as the result of running frasteg. Frasteg is proof of concept 
application, see Appendix A for details. Given a input bitmap file and steganographic 
data Frasteg generates a resulting bitmap file which is visually identical to the original. 
Frasteg successfully retrieves the hidden data.
We describe a series of visual and statistical tests on the steganographic image file, we 
next, present tests of the method for goodness of data hiding. Statistical methods are 
applied to the steganographic image file to determine how good the method is at hiding 
information. Also tests of the robustness of the method are presented.
7 .1  Steg an o g rap h ic Im age Q uality
7.1.1 V isual Tests
Figure 9 shows an original bitmap girl.bmp and a new bitmap test.bmp. With the 
steganographic data Hello world hidden in test.bmp.
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Figure 9. Girl with hidden data 1
The steganographic data has been hidden in the bottom left comer of the test.bmp. But as 
you can see the two bitmaps are virtually identical.
Figure 10 shows the range region ( zoomed by a factor of 600% ) of the original bitmap 
girl.bmp and the corresponding region in the new bitmap test.bmp. But again the 
modifications are not visible to the human eye.
However if the original and modified images are placed side by side at a zoom factor of 
5000% it may be possible to see the modifications ( see figure 8). But it is very difficult 
to do so. With a zoom factor of 5000% it is only possible to see a 10x10 pixel region on a 
21 inch monitor. Several people were asked if they noticed differences in the two zoomed 
images. Some said they did but admitted that they were not sure.
A test took place where several people were shown the original and modified images side 
by side zoomed by a factor of 3000%. The participants in the test were told the position 




Figure 12 shows the selected range blocks with the modified pixel values. The selected 
locations are in the least sensitive parts o f the image. That is the hair and shoulder which 
is in shadow.
FRASTEG Windows Application - TEST.BMP
File Edit View Steganography Window Help
Figure 12. Ranges for Hiding
Table 11 is a list of the pixel values in a portion of the girl.bmp image. The pixel values 
in the selected range when hiding Hello world are shown in bold.
4871 31 2f 4d 43 3f 8a 5c 31 7d 5d 2d 31 31 30 45 4 f 43 46 27 34 49 60 29 5e 49 79 39 4a 50 51 5e
51 75 2a 4b 4a 4c 7a 65 29 39 83 7b 38 26 27 3c 59 4a 35 2c 29 37 5f 4a 57 82 7f 31 36 36 48 4f 52
50 69 25 5e 52 85 7f 31 25 38 7a 7f 33 48 37 3a 5b 40 58 27 4c 51 7c 53 76 76 2f 27 25 2a 37 3e 4d
54 70 38 56 68 92 53 29 29 31 64 4b 3b 3d 27 50 42 6d 3a 32 48 57 69 5f 6f 2a 25 le 24 2a 32 3c 47
3e 67 4a 40 8e 85 3d 2a 25 51 74 2c 41 21 30 50 6c 65 24 3a 43 68 6e 4d 35 31 2c 2b 24 30 32 30 38
39 6a 42 53 82 65 37 28 51 63 77 4c 21 22 43 4a 86 2b 29 56 5e 78 41 2d 3d 27 33 28 26 33 2d 31 31
43 6f 3d 76 7b 35 27 24 64 64 6d 2d le 29 62 74 47 30 48 71 76 73 54 43 46 27 25 25 2e 28 2e 3b 2e
49 70 4a 7c 68 24 24 32 5b 75 4d If 3b 58 39 79 31 4d 64 62 7d 38 6f 61 35 2d 2b 2d 29 28 20 25 2c
5d 69 75 64 4c 2c 21 5b 53 7d 20 le 3d 34 72 38 4e 34 80 6a 64 65 6e 66 28 29 2d 2e 2a 2c 29 23 2b
64 69 77 74 49 3b 36 2e 69 41 45 2c 39 75 4d 57 32 53 78 70 84 94 65 3a 2c 35 21 2e 2b 26 34 33 2b
56 6c 4f 5d 2f 2e 2b 34 66 26 2b 41 44 89 2e 2c 38 47 66 73 a4 7b 29 43 34 2e 23 2c 2d 28 2d 28 2c
4d 64 54 3e 2a 2e 2d 5c 47 2c 31 2f 7a 3e 3e 42 59 55 47 8b 82 4e 28 49 53 27 26 28 30 2d 25 24 2d
45 55 53 2a 2a 2e 2a 5b 47 47 3a 32 61 2e 45 33 4 f 45 5c 9b 6b 58 24 4c 46 34 28 2e 2c 34 28 27 2a
50 56 31 2e 31 26 34 57 58 33 32 51 2c 3b 39 6c 35 44 76 8b 37 53 5c 67 3b 2e 2c 2f 2f 2a 31 29 26
45 51 35 32 30 24 42 54 37 2d 37 57 33 2f 46 5b 2 f 54 46 77 48 77 8e 6b 2a 2e 34 2b 30 2f 2b 2a 2b
3c 3b 2b 2f 31 2c 41 37 23 3c 3a 40 3b 39 40 38 47 3e 49 7f 8e 80 62 57 41 2f 34 2b 29 27 2c 2c 31
3c 2e 31 2e 29 34 36 24 36 47 3b 3a 32 2a 31 43 43 81 83 aa 84 5a 54 73 8d 35 2e 2d 29 2b 2a 2e 2a
3e 31 2e 29 29 32 27 2b 3b 2d 5b 34 33 30 23 4d 83 76 8d 86 67 5f 65 5c 77 2b 2b 33 2c 33 31 2e 2c
3f 31 41 2f 28 23 26 41 39 29 39 2e 2e 25 5c 67 9d 90 71 8c 49 61 79 7b 54 28 26 33 37 29 24 28 2a
37 3d 34 32 2d 28 37 3d 2a 31 2e 24 2b 63 6c 86 92 64 91 6a 71 58 39 6e 56 29 28 30 36 31 2a 2f 32
32 33 29 36 2a 34 35 2f 23 22 33 29 61 5a 7a 71 80 90 68 71 57 56 7d 5c 30 23 2a 2e 36 3b 2b 28 2d
3b 2a 26 2e 31 34 2 f 31 55 If 26 65 49 63 80 8e 98 70 2b 37 67 6d 73 3f 5a 2d 30 2f 36 30 31 2c 25
2d 2f 2f 35 33 31 2c 2d 75 If 48 75 60 7a 67 9e 55 31 48 48 42 45 4b 42 96 3e 3c 55 32 2b 33 32 24
2d 29 27 37 29 28 39 38 3a 41 61 5e 56 85 90 53 30 40 49 28 41 3a 30 37 52 51 58 65 52 25 2e 32 2c
29 2e 37 2c 28 26 50 2f 31 41 2f 3c 79 7a 8a 31 4c 2b 20 2f 3c 5b 47 29 5b 7e 5b 52 7e 23 33 3b 34
30 40 37 2b 27 28 46 4f 33 31 2b 47 7b 76 43 5e 2a 3b 29 23 5c 96 32 34 56 44 40 80 7f 25 31 30 35
3e 32 43 40 2f 24 3d 6f 35 2a 2b 33 6a 61 43 2a 30 2d 38 62 95 6d 39 30 3f 47 7b b3 b4 69 2c 32 3a
32 2b 46 31 3d 2e 2d 60 3c 2f 35 38 65 59 22 2b 63 54 87 6e 83 53 3b 3e 5d 80 9b 7c 73 a9 25 35 30
2e 38 67 2a 31 35 3a 35 58 3d 39 4a 71 27 24 85 93 7f 8e 59 7e 6b 59 42 72 6a 86 6c 3a 81 2a 2a 3c
2f 3b 37 28 2c 2b 45 2b 4f 56 3b 61 50 31 5d 6a 46 59 5d 8d 72 61 3c 63 81 93 50 58 35 33 21 27 44
37 49 2b 28 2e 28 4b 28 38 5d 3e 5d 25 55 56 4d 72 6b 74 7b 6a 5f 74 79 8f 6b 2b 69 29 30 28 26 3a
37 46 2b 27 27 23 3c 27 2d 5a 63 24 2a 55 41 52 60 79 61 81 83 64 7b 7e 8a 29 2b 78 25 25 46 20 24
Tablell. Girl pixel values
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Table 12 shows the selected range blocks with the modified pixel values in hello.bmp. 
This is after Hello world is hidden in hello.bmp.
48 71 31 2f 4d 43 3f 8a 5c 31 7d 5d 2d 31 31 30 45 4 f 43 46 27 34 49 60 29 5e 49 79 39 4f 56 53 60
51 75 2a 4b 4a 4c 7a 65 29 39 83 7b 38 26 27 3c 59 4a 35 2c 29 37 5f 4a 57 82 7f 31 36 3e 47 53 55
50 69 25 5e 52 85 I f 31 25 38 7a 7f 33 48 37 3a 5b 40 58 27 4c 51 7c 53 76 76 2f 27 25 2c 32 3d 4b
54 70 38 56 68 92 53 29 29 31 64 4b 3b 3d 27 50 42 6d 3a 32 48 57 69 5f 6f 2a 25 le 24 2d 36 39 44
3e 67 4a 40 8e 85 3d 2a 25 51 74 2c 41 21 30 50 6c 65 24 3a 43 68 6e 4d 35 2b 29 29 29 31 31 34 33
39 6a 42 53 82 65 37 28 51 63 77 4c 21 22 43 4a 86 2b 29 56 5e 78 41 2d 3d 2a 2c 2a 29 30 31 31 30
43 6f 3d 76 7b 35 27 24 64 64 6d 2d le 29 62 74 47 30 48 71 76 73 54 43 46 2a 2b 27 28 2e 30 30 2c
49 70 4a 7c 68 24 24 32 5b 75 4d If 3b 58 39 79 31 4d 64 62 7d 38 6f 61 35 2b 2a 2a 29 26 22 23 25
5d 69 75 64 4c 2c 21 5b 53 7d 20 le 3d 34 72 38 4e 34 80 6a 64 65 6e 66 28 29 2d 2e 2a 2b 2d 2e 2a
64 69 77 74 49 3b 36 2e 69 41 45 2c 39 75 4d 57 32 53 78 70 84 94 65 3a 2c 35 21 2e 2b 28 29 2d 2b
56 6c 4f 5d 2f 2e 2b 34 66 26 2b 41 44 89 2e 2c 38 47 66 73 a4 7b 29 43 34 2e 23 2c 2d 2c 2e 28 2c
4d 64 54 3e 2a 2e 2d 5c 47 2c 31 2f 7a 3e 3e 42 59 55 47 8b 82 4e 28 49 53 27 26 28 30 28 28 28 2d
45 55 53 2a 2a 2e 2a 5b 47 47 3a 32 61 2e 45 33 4f 45 5c 9b 6b 58 24 4c 46 30 2d 2e 2c 2f 2c 24 2c
50 56 31 2e 31 26 34 57 58 33 32 51 2c 3b 39 6c 35 44 76 8b 37 53 5c 67 3b 30 2f 2d 2e 2e 2e 2b 26
45 51 35 32 30 24 42 54 37 2d 37 57 33 2f 46 5b 2 f 54 46 77 48 77 8e 6b 2a 30 30 2d 2d 2f 2a 2b 2a
3c 3b 2b 2f 31 2c 41 37 23 3c 3a 40 3b 39 40 38 47 3e 49 7f 8e 80 62 57 41 31 31 2d 2b 28 2a 2f 2d
35 32 2d 2b 29 34 36 24 36 47 3b 3a 32 2a 31 43 43 81 83 aa 84 5a 54 73 8d 34 28 2a 2c 2b 2a 2e 2a
38 35 31 2f 29 32 27 2b 3b 2d 5b 34 33 30 23 4d 83 76 8d 86 67 5f 65 5c 77 2b 2d 2f 2f 33 31 2e 2c
32 37 35 30 28 23 26 41 39 29 39 2e 2e 25 5c 67 9d 90 71 8c 49 61 79 7b 54 2a 2e 35 34 29 24 28 2a
41 44 39 33 2d 28 37 3d 2a 31 2e 24 2b 63 6c 86 92 64 91 6a 71 58 39 6e 56 2c 30 35 32 31 2a 2f 32
35 2c 2b 3a 2a 34 35 2f 23 22 33 29 61 5a 7a 71 80 90 68 71 57 56 7d 5c 30 23 2a 2e 36 33 2e 27 2c
36 2b 2d 39 31 34 2f 31 55 If 26 65 49 63 80 8e 98 70 2b 37 67 6d 73 3f 5a 2d 30 2f 36 31 33 2b 21
28 2b 2e 39 33 31 2c 2d 75 If 48 75 60 7a 67 9e 55 31 48 48 42 45 4b 42 96 3e 3c 55 32 2e 31 32 28
28 2b 2e 3a 29 28 39 38 3a 41 61 5e 56 85 90 53 30 40 49 28 41 3a 30 37 52 51 58 65 52 28 31 31 30
29 2e 37 2c 28 26 50 2f 31 41 2f 3c 79 7a 8a 31 4c 2b 20 2f 3c 5b 47 29 5b 7e 5b 52 7e 23 33 3b 34
30 40 37 2b 27 28 46 4f 33 31 2b 47 7b 76 43 5e 2a 3b 29 23 5c 96 32 34 56 44 40 80 7f 25 31 30 35
3e 32 43 40 2f 24 3d 6f 35 2a 2b 33 6a 61 43 2a 30 2d 38 62 95 6d 39 30 3f 47 7b b3 b4 69 2c 32 3a
32 2b 46 31 3d 2e 2d 60 3c 2f 35 38 65 59 22 2b 63 54 87 6e 83 53 3b 3e 5d 80 9b 7c 73 a9 25 35 30
2e 38 67 2a 31 35 3a 35 58 3d 39 4a 71 27 24 85 93 7f 8e 59 7e 6b 59 42 72 6a 86 6c 3a 81 2a 2a 3c
2f 3b 37 28 2c 2b 45 2b 4f 56 3b 61 50 31 5d 6a 46 59 5d 8d 72 61 3c 63 81 93 50 58 35 33 21 27 44
37 49 2b 28 2e 28 4b 28 38 5d 3e 5d 25 55 56 4d 72 6b 74 7b 6a 5f 74 79 8f 6b 2b 69 29 30 28 26 3a
37 46 2b 27 27 23 3c 27 2d 5a 63 24 2a 55 41 52 60 79 61 81 83 64 7b 7e 8a 29 2b 78 25 25 46 20 24
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Table 12 Girl with hidden data pixel values
In table 12 (steganographic image), pixel values shown in bold are virtually identical to 
those in table 11 (original image). Also the resulting pixel values are reasonable, in that 
there is no obvious pattern between them, and the surrounding unmodified pixels.
7.1.2 Statistical Tests
The quality of the steganographic image file is all important. The image file with the 
hidden information must be as close as possible to the original. If  the steganographic 
image file is not modified very much then our modifications can be confused with noise.
With our method only parts o f the image will be changed. That is we modify small sub- 
regions of the image. We replace one block with a similar block. In this section we 
present details on the relative modification.
The first test that we did is the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) which we used to 
measure the difference between the original block and the modified block. It is defined as
PSNR = 20 log10( — ]\rmsJ
where b is the largest value o f the signal (255 in this case ) and rms is the rms difference 
between the two images. The PSNR is given in decibel units (dB). An increase of 20 dB 
corresponds to a ten-fold decrease in the rms difference between the two images.
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PSNR for some test im ages
Figure 13. PNSR/or modified range blocks
The graph shows that the PSNR is approximately 29.5 for the test images. This compares 
favourably with JPEG. In these tests we kept the maximum tolerance level (E) between 
the two blocks at 5.0.
We also tested the standard deviation between an original pixel and the one that is 
replacing it. A different stream of steganographic data was used in each test, and this was 
inserted into the same image.
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Standard Deviation of pixel values with different stego data
Figure 14. Standard Deviation of pixel values with different steganographic data
The average standard deviation was found to be 4.1. When different steganographic 
streams are to be hidden in the same image then different blocks will be selected for 
modification. The selected tolerance levels would be different. The higher the tolerance 
level the more the standard deviation for that particular block. This explains the graph.
We also tested the standard deviation between an original pixel and the one that is 
replacing it. We did this across a series of images with the same stream of steganographic 
data.
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Standard Deviation of pixel values with same stego data across a
number of im ages
Figure 15. Standard Deviation across a number o f images
The average standard deviation was found to be 4.6 in this case. This means that, if  a 
pixel is modified by our algorithm, then on average ±5 levels o f grey will be added to the 
pixel. This corresponds with adding noise into the image; noise normally effects the least 
significant 3 bits.
7.2 Data Hiding A bility
We show here the results of applying some standard statistical tests49 to the resulting 
steganographic image files.
7.2.1 Run Length E ncoding Tests
The first series of results show some run length encoding tests. The first series of tests 
applied to the data hiding was the number of consecutive occurrences of a 0 or a 1. On the
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Y-axis is the number of occurrences, on the X-axis is the length of the run. For example 












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
run length




























0   ~   -----------------------------
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
run length
Figure 16C. Comparison of run lengths between original and stego images
In the above graphs the results for the original image and the steganographic image can 
be seen to be almost identical. So a cryptanalyst could not reliably use this test as a means 
of determining modification. Also this statistical test has been applied to the modified 
blocks. A cryptanalyst would not have this information. So his/her analysis would be 
restricted to the whole image or to portions o f it.
The following tests graph the number of occurrences of values of 1-7 that occur in the 
original image file against the steganographic image file.
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value of low o rder 3 bits
 Original Image
 Stego Image
Figure 17A. Consecutive occurrences o f values in modified pixels
. Original Image 
- Stego Image
value of low o rder 3 bits
Figure 17B. Consecutive occurrences of values in modified pixels
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In the above graphs the results for the original image and the steganographic image can 
be seen to be almost identical. So a cryptanalyst could not reliably use this test as a means 
of determining modification. Also this statistical test has been applied to the modified 
blocks. A cryptanalyst would not have this information. So his/her analysis would be 
restricted to the whole image or to portions o f it.
7.2.2 M odified Pixel V ariations
In the following tests we look at how much the pixels are modified. Here we are trying to 
determine how far away from the original pixel is a modified one. We graph the original 
image against the steganographic image file. The graph shows the pixel values in the 
modified blocks plotted against their original values.
These tests will help to determine if  there is major changes in pixel values from the 
original values. We don’t want major changes as this would be noticeable by a number of 
means. For example a cryptanalyst could graph the pixel values across a line of pixels in 
the image. These lines can be diagonal, vertical etc. The cryptanalyst could then watch for 
major deviations in say one pixel value in the line. This may then point the cryptanalyst 




Figure 18A. Modification o f Pixels in Stego Image
Original Image File
Pixel Number
Figure 18B. The Original Image file
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There is no pattern o f modification, that is the modifications appear random, and as such 
will be confused with noise. We found that there were no outliners, that is pixels whose 
value varies widely from surrounding pixels. We are using the modified blocks in this 
test, a cryptanalyst would not have this information available.
7 .3  Variation in P ixel V a lu e s  in L in e s  in the R an g e Region
In this section we take lines o f pixels at random across a modified range block, and check 
for major discrepancies between pixel values. These tests are again, a standard means of 
determining data hiding ability.
We will take scan lines for simplicity. We plot the pixel values for a portion of a scan 
line.
Plot of pixel values in some scan lines
pixel numbers
Figure 19A. Plot o f pixel values in some scan lines o f stego image file
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Plot of pixel values of some scan lines
pixel positions
Figure 19B. Plot o f pixel values o f some scan lines o f stego image file 
Wc found no major discrepancies between pixel values in our tests.
7.4  R o b u stn e ss
In this section we present the results for the robustness of our algorithm. We test the 
ability for the steganographic data to survive corruption.
7.4.1 Minimum value for linear correlation coefficient
On retrieval we will be testing for a linear relationship between a given range block and a 
domain block. Each domain block in the domain library has to be checked. For each 
match we determine the linear correlation coefficient r. If /■ is greater than some minimum 
value we say a match has occurred. In any given image when comparing blocks of the 
image in the manner required by our algorithm values for r can be high for any two such 
arbitrary blocks.
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We want to set the minimum value for r for which a match is said to exist. We would like 
this minimum to be as much less than 1 as possible. We want this because in a 
multimedia environment the liner relationship will be skewed due to compression etc in a 
multimedia environment. We determine the minimum value for r ( we call it corrmin ) by 
taking a set of images and matching blocks at random and so determine values for r 
which could occur during information retrieval.
Figure 20. Calculation of minimum match correlation coefficient
For the experiments the minimum value for corrmjn was determined to be 0.96. However 
it is still possible to match two blocks at random and get a value for corrmjn greater than
0.96. We will deal with these blocks in Chapter 10.
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7.4.2 Adding Noise to the Steganographic Image File
In these tests we add noise into the steganographic image file. In the following results 
noise was added to the whole image. The noise added was plus or minus one to a random 
pixel value. A particular pixel value could be modified several times. The values for r 
were determined for the modified range blocks and their associated domain blocks.
%  of pixels modified vs average R
%  of pixels modified
Figure 21 A. Plot o f average r against % modified pixels
In this test we found that the r values will remain greater than the minimum correlation 
coefficient.
In the next test random pixels were modified by plus or minus 3. The percentage of 
modified pixels by this amount was plotted against the average r of the modified range 
blocks and their associated domain blocks.
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%  of pixels modified vs average R
%  of pixels modified
Figure 2 ID, Plot o f average r against % modified pixels
In this test it was found that the average correlation coefficient for the modified range 
blocks will slip below corrmin when 95% of the pixels were modified.
7.4.3 Adding Noise to the Steganographic information
In these tests noise was added to the modified range and their associated domain regions. 
The steganographic data was retrieved. The x-axis in the following graphs indicates the 
number of bits modified in the domain and range regions. The y axis indicates the value 
o f r. If the value for r remains greater than corrmin then we will be able to successfully 
retrieve the hidden information.
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Plot of R against added noise
noise added to domain and range blocks
Figure 22A. Plot ofr values against noise added to pixels o f modified range blocks
In figure 22A the steganographie data was successfully retrieved.
Plot of R against added noise
Added noise to domain and range blocks
Figure 22B. Plot ofr values against noise added to pixels of modified range blocks
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In figure 22B the steganographie data was not successfully retrieved when the minimum 
match correlation coefficient was kept at 0.96. If the coefficient was reduced to 9.1 the 
modified ranges were successfully found, however this caused 5% spurious matches to 
occur. That is we retrieved 5% extra bits in error.
Plot of R  against added noise
noise added to domain and range blocks
Figure 22C. Plot o f r values against noise added to pixels o f modified range blocks
In figure 22C the steganographie data was not successfully retrieved. Reducing the 
minimum match value of r to 0.9 yielded a 75% success rate of bit retrieval. Reducing the 
minimum match value ( corrmin ) to 0.7 caused the steganographie data to be retrieved 
successfully. However there was a 25% extra bits retrieved due to spurious matches of 
range with domain blocks.
7 .5  Data Hiding Bandw idth
In these tests we measure the limits of data hiding bandwidth. In these tests we attempt to 
measure the amount o f information that can be hidden in a typical range using a typical 
domain region.
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The amount o f information that can be hidden depends on the size of the domain and 
range regions.
The following graphs show the relationship between bandwidth of data hiding and the 
domain and range region sizes. In each of these graphs the domain and range regions are 
square shaped.
Hidden Data for Range Region 40x40
Domain Region size
Hidden Data for Range Region 50x50
Domain Region size
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Hidden Data for Range Region 60x60
Domain Region size
Hidden Data for Range Region 70x70
Domain Region size
Figure 23 Plot of Range Region Bandwidth against Domain Region size.
The results show that:-
• for a range region size there is a point at which the region gets saturated for data 
hiding. This is because there are a limited number of range blocks in a given range 
region that we can use.
• there is a steady increase of bandwidth against range region size.
• we can hide approximately 0.035 bits of hidden data per pixel in the range region.
We tried to apply Shannon’s information theory, to determine the theoretical limits on the 
data hiding bandwidth ( See Appendix B for details). However we found that this theory 
is only applicable to a data hiding method that operates in the frequency domain.
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7.5.1 Visual Effect of Increasing Bandwidth
The next test is to show how the steganographic image is visually effect by increasing the 
bandwidth o f hidden information. The range region is 70x70 pixels and the range blocks 
are 3x3 pixels. The following table lists the various figures and the amount of hidden 
information is in each.
# of Bits of Hidden Information % of range blocks used
Figure 25 56 9
Figure 26 131 21
Figure 27 199 32
Figure 28 245 39
Table 13 Amount of hidden information in the figures.
We first show the original range region and then the same region after inserting various 
amounts o f hidden information.
Figure 24 Original Range region before data hiding
9 6
Figure 25 Range Region after hiding 56 bits o f hidden information.
Figure 26 Range Region after hiding 131 bits o f hidden information.
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Figure 27 Range Region after hiding 199 bits o f hidden information.
Figure 28 Range Region after hiding 245 bits o f hidden information.
The results in this test show that visually there is little difference between the range 
regions. However the more modifications that are made to a region the more likely that 





In this chapter we discuss the security of the method. We discuss the ability of the
method to stand up to cryptanalysis, and keep the hidden message secure. We look at
various enhancements to the basic algorithm to increase the security of the method.
In order to retrieve the hidden information a cryptanalyst has to discover:-
• The correct positions of the range and domain blocks in the image.
• The correct shape of the range and domain blocks within the region.
• The correct order of blocks selected during hiding.
We make the following assumptions:-
• The cryptanalyst knows that our method has been applied to the image.
• In trying the range and domain regions that the cryptanalyst does not incorrectly
identify a hidden message. This in fact can very easily occur especially if we relax our
corrmjn value. The cryptanalyst can legitimately discover matches between blocks in 
chosen range and domain regions.
We could further confuse the cryptanalyst, by deliberately placing bogus messages 
into the unused portions o f the image. We discuss this ploy later in this chapter; these 
bogus messages could be very short. If the steganographic information is encrypted, 
before being hidden, then these spurious messages will be a major problem for the 
cryptanalyst; Because each message that is found, has to be validated before being 
tossed away. We can place many of these bogus messages into a typical image. These
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bogus messages usually cause no reduction in bandwidth; because the algorithm will 
chose approximatly, the same set of range blocks to modify, in any selected range 
region.
•  We have not taken into account the correct adjustment of the corrmjn value by the 
cryptanalyst; this is very important. As if  too low a value is chosen extra bits of 
hidden information will be retrieved, too high a value and bits will be lost. We 
assume that by luck the cryptanalyst chooses the correct value for corrm\n.
8.1 Se lectin g  Dom ain and R ange R e g io n s
The method allows part of an image to be chosen as a range region and part to be chosen 
as the domain region. A user could then implement further protection on the 
steganographic data by selecting known parts of the image for range and domain regions. 
These regions would form a kind of key.
For example the user marks a square part of the image as the range region Ij  and another 
square part of the image as the domain region I2  . The data hiding algorithm would then 
proceed as described in chapter 6.
When retrieving the steganographic data, the user specifies the correct initial squares for 
the range and domain regions. There are many possible combinations here. For example 
in a 256x256 image with the range regions being 32x32 and the domain region being 
32x32. There are 225*225 = 50625 possible range regions of this size. The domain 
regions cannot overlap the range regions. Therefore in this case there are 193*193 = 
37249 possible domain regions for each of the 50625 range regions. This yields a total of 
1,885,730,625 possibilities.
Some regions need not be searched because they could be background. But in practice the 
background of a typical image may not consist of constant values. If a noise filtering 
algorithm ( such as the median filtering algorithm50) has been applied to the image then 
this image is not suitable for data hiding. Noise in an image causes slight variations in
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pixel values, in a region that should have constant values. A noise filtering algorithm 
typically causes these regions to become constant in terms of pixel value.
Also the numbers given are for a grey scale image of 256x256. If we had an image of 
1024x1024 this would yield a lot more possible regions.
However the domain region does not have to be the same size as the range region. Also 
the regions themselves don’t have to be square. For example we could have a range 
region of size 21x43 and a domain region of 31x46. Therefore a cryptanalyst would have 
to try all domain and range regions of size say 32,33,34, and so on.
When we try polygonal regions the number o f combinations increases. For example we 
could have 3,4,5 sided regions.
The major advantage of this pseudo key is that the key is visual. A user does not have to 
remember funny numbers. He/she simply remembers the range and domain region sizes 
and their positions.
8.2 Other R ange and Dom ain block Partitioning m ethods
This section describes a simple update to the algorithm in chapter 6. The data hiding 
algorithm would work in the exact same way. It is just the underlying fractal method that 
changes.
The use of a more sophisticated algorithm than quadtree could be used as the basis for the 
method. For example the H-V51 partitioning of the image. In this algorithm rectangles are 
used as the basis for the range and domain blocks. A range block is recursively 
partitioned either horizontally or vertically to form two new rectangles. The decision to 
split horizontally is based on the context. Figure 24 shows possible steps in building the 





The range and domain blocks are rectangular shaped. The use of this algorithm as a basis 
for the data hiding method would make it even more difficult for a cryptanalyst to find 
the hidden data. This is because user input could be used as a parameter in the decision as 
to the size of some of the rectangular blocks.
The triangular partition scheme would yield even better results if  used as the basis for the 
data hiding method. In this method the ranges are built by splitting the image into two 
triangles. Each of these triangles is recursively subdivided into four triangles. This 
process continues until a range can be covered by a domain. The domain blocks in the 
domain library are also triangular.
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8.3 R ange and Dom ain block s iz e s
Within a range region of say size 64 we can choose to use ranges of size 3,4,5 or any 
combination of those sizes. The quadtree algorithm has domain blocks of twice the size 
as the domain region. The hiding algorithm would work for domain blocks smaller or 
bigger by various factors. For example domain blocks that are 1.5 times as big as the 
range blocks. All that is required is a consistent averaging function which brings the 
domain block size to that of the range region. It is even possible to have domain blocks 
that are say 0.5, 0.75,1.0,1.25,1.5 etc. times the size of the range blocks.
All of these factors could be inputted by the user to the hiding algorithm yielding a vast 
amount of combinations that would have to be searched by a cryptanalyst.
8.4 D istributed B lo ck s
It is possible to distribute a block throughout a region. This means that a block is made up 
a pseudo random set of pixels taken from different parts of the region. The only limitation 
required is that a pixel only belongs to one block. A range and domain blocks may be 
distributed. If this scheme of things was implemented then it would yield a vast amount 
of searches.
A pseudo random pixel selector would have to choose pixels for a block. This is so that 
the resulting pixels output by the algorithm would be close to the originals.
For example if we had a 32x32 region with block sizes of 4x4 with all blocks being used 
then we would have
1024*1023*1022 ...
possible choices for the pixels. Not all blocks could be used and not all pixel 
combinations could go together. For example, we can eliminate domain blocks that have
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no variation in pixel value; because if  a domain block consists of mainly the same pixel 
value, then the algorithm will produce a new range block with constant values, these 
constant values will be in the same locations as those of the domain block. In general, this 
produced block will not be a good approximation to the original range block. So, to make 
our algorithm more efficient we should chose pixel combinations in an intelligent 
manner.
However this formula assumes that we know were the region is and the shape of the 
blocks in it. As well as that we have not included the domain region in our calculations. 
In the domain region the same pixels could be used over and over again meaning we get 





Robustness in a Multimedia Environment
In general in a multimedia environment noise is added to the pixels in an image. This 
noise is spread in a constant manner over the image. In theory there is a trade off between 
robustness and security. To make the method more robust we must basically do more 
modification of the original image. The more modification we do the more the 
cryptanalyst will known that something is going on. So there is a trade off between 
robustness and security.
There is no problem with inserting the hidden information. But a problem arises during 
retrieval if  the steganographic image is corrupted. In the first section we clarify what 
problems there are with our algorithm in a multimedia environment.
The conclusions of chapter 7, show that our method, is not robust enough to allow hidden 
information, to survive through multimedia processing. In fact any spatial domain 
information hiding method will have the problem. This is because a spatial domain 
method usually hides information into the low order bits of the pixels. The modification 
of these bits does not effect image quality. Image compression techniques such as JPEG, 
also exploit this fact by storing information about the high order bits of pixels, but 
ignoring the low order bits; this leads to compression.
A frequency domain information hiding method, has been proved to be more robust for 
allowing hidden information to survive through multimedia processing52. We therefore 
consider enhansing our method to include some frequency information to allow the 
hiding data to survive through multimedia processing. Several schemes were tried in line
106
with the fractal method. Each will be described and results presented, if  the scheme 
proved successful enough to bring to a proof of concept implementation.
9.1 Problem s with the retrieval
In a multimedia environment the steganographic image file may be highly corrupted. This 
leads to a few problems which are related to this corruption. These problems must be 
solved in order to make our algorithm more robust.
• The linear relationship between the range block and the domain block will be 
corrupted. That is the steganographic information will be corrupted. In this case the 
calculation of the linear correlation coefficient r may yield a value less than corrmjn. 
This would lead to us to miss a relationship between a range and a domain block. 
Therefore we would loose one bit of the steganographic data.
• On retrieval there may just happen to be a linear relationships between a given range 
block and a domain block. We don’t want to assume that this relationship was placed 
in the steganographic image file by us. In this case the calculation of linear 
correlation coefficient r may give a value greater than corrm\n. We would incorrectly 
assume that a match exits between the range and the domain blocks. Therefore we 
would retrieve an extra erroneous bit of steganographic data.
We will now describe a set of the major attempts that were made so as to assist in making 
our steganographic algorithm more robust. We have identified the following techniques 
to assist in the robustness of the algorithm. The results of each of these techniques are 
presented.
9.2 D estroying sp u rio u s relatio n sh ip s
During hiding we do a linear correlation coefficient test for unused range blocks. If this 
test yields a result close to our minimum match probability, we do a DCT and
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quantization phase of JPEG on the range block. Then we reverse the quantization and do 
an IDCT to create a new range block similar to the original. This new range block is 
stored in place of the original. We do this do as to destroy the spurious linear relationship 
between the original range and domain blocks. However we have to do this again in a 
loop because we may now have introduced another spurious relationship with a different 
domain block.
This method does not stop spurious relationships from occurring in a multimedia 
environment. When we do a linear regression on a block in the range region and a 
particular block in the domain region we may generate correlation coefficient of close to 
corrmin- This correlation coefficient would be close to corrmin due to corruption of the 
pixels in the steganographic image.
9.2.1 Security
The security here would be much the same as the previous chapter. However we need to 
statistically analyse those blocks for which an approximation has been stored. The 
following graph shows some original pixel values taken from various modified range 
blocks and their modified equivalents.
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Plot of Original values against modified ones
Original value
Figure 30. DCT method: Modified pixels vs originals
Our tests show that there is very little discrepancy between the original and the modified 
one. 'Phis discrepancy produces little by way of a signature that can be seen by a 
cryptanalyst. These modifications may guide the cryptanalyst away from the real hidden 
data blocks.
9.2.2 R obustness
Our tests show that this technique is more robust allowing us to reduce our minimum 
correlation coefficient to 8.9. However there is no guarantee in general that this minimum 
will be surpassed by a spurious relationship between two blocks.
In the following lest which is similar to Figure 19C above.
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Plot of R against added noise
noise added to domain and range blocks
Figure 31. DCT method: Plot o f r values against noise added to pixels of modified range
blocks
The steganographic data was successfully retrieved. Even reducing the minimum match 
value of r to 0.9 yielded a 75% success rate of bit retrieval. Reducing the minimum match 
value ( corrm\n ) to 0.7 caused the steganographic data to be retrieved successfully. 
However there was a 5% extra bits retrieved due to spurious matches o f range with 
domain blocks. Without the use of this enhancement there were 25% extra spurious bits 
retrieved. Therefore the robustness of the method has been enhanced.
9.2.3 C onclusions
• This technique increases the robustness of the algorithm. It eliminates a lot of 
spurious relationships even in a multimedia environment. However it cannot 
guarantee that the hidden information will be successfully retrieved.
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• The method proved not to be robust enough to support a corruption of more than ±4 
in the pixel values. This would not be good enough to survive in a multimedia 
environment where pixel values could be modified by much more than that.
• This technique could be used along with others described to give a probability that an 
image is watermarked with a particular set of hidden information. That is given a set 
of possible watermarks53 we could say that the image is marked with this particular 
watermark.
Destroying Spurious Relationships
Robustness It eliminates a lot of spurious relationships even in a multimedia 
environment. However it cannot guarantee that the hidden 
information will be successfully retrieved.
Security • Extra JPEGed blocks could be noticed by cryptanalyst.
• The cryptanalyst how has to pick the value for corrmin, which is a 
real number. So extra complexity for cryptanalyst.
Image Quality Affects image quality because we are doing extra things to image.
Bandwidth No effect.
Table 14. Destroying Spurious Relationship Results
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9.3 U se larger range and dom ain b lo ck s.
The hope here is that the use o f larger range blocks will increase the robustness o f the
algorithm.
9.3.1 Security
• During hiding to use larger blocks we need to increase the tolerance. The larger
blocks the more the standard deviation will increase between the steganographic
image file and the original.
• It will be easier to spot the modified range block. When we produce an approximation
to a large block there is more of an approximation taken and so more noise is
introduced.
We will be able to store less steganographic information into a typical image. We could
for example be modifying say 64 pixels to hide one bit of the steganographic data.
9.3.2 R obustness
• This will give more data points in the linear relationship.
• The more data points we have the more the error will be spread over a larger number
of pixels and so give a value for r will be closer to 1.
• The more data points we have the less likely that a spurious relationship who’s
correlation coefficient is greater than corrmin will exist between a range and a domain 
block.
The tests we tried were to insert noise into the range and domain regions in the same
manner as in chapter 7.
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Plot of R against added noise
noise added to domain and range blocks
Figure 32. Large Range Blocks: Plot of r values against noise added to pixels of modified
range blocks
The steganographic data was successfully retrieved. Here we show the results of using 
larger range blocks in our algorithm.
Plot of R against added noise
noise added to domain and range blocks
Figure 33. Large Range Blocks: Plot o f r values against noise added to pixels o f modified
range blocks
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The steganographic data was not successfully retrieved when the minimum match 
correlation coefficient was kept at 0.96. However if  the coefficient was reduced to 9.2 the 
data was successfully retrieved.
9.3.3 C onclusions
• A very small amount of steganographic data could be hidden. In a typical image only
a few bytes. In order to store more data it would visually become apparent that
something was going on.
• The method proved not to be robust enough to support a corruption of more than ±3
in the pixel values. This would not be good enough to survive in a multimedia
environment where pixel values could be modified by much more than that.
Larg er Range and Dom ain Blocks
Robustness Easier to recover hidden data in multimedia environment.
Security Larger modified range blocks could be noticed by cryptanalyst.
Image Quality Effects image quality because we making bigger modifications to 
the range blocks.
Bandwidth Bandwidth greatly reduced.
Table 15. Larger Range and Domain Blocks
9.4 Fractal based  D C T
The algorithm of this section is as follows
• We transform the original image file into the frequency domain.
• We find matching domain and range blocks in a similar manner to chapter 3 except 
we are using the frequency coefficients instead of the pixel values.
114
• We quantizise the resulting frequency coefficients. That is we maintain the usefull 
frequency components and throw away the others.
• For a matching domain and range block we determine scaling and offset factors using 
the RMS metric. We don’t use the full range and domain block for this match only the 
high order frequency coefficients.
• We build a new range block using the determined scaling and offset factors.
• We store this new range block in place of the original in the steganographic frequency 
coefficient file.
• We reverse quantizise the frequency coefficients.
• We use the reverse DCT transform to build a resulting steganographic image file.
• The retrieval algorithm does the reverse of this process.
This is entirely new work. As far as we are aware no one has tried to hide information in
this manner. See the work of54 55 for techniques on which this idea is based.
We built an implementation of this algorithm to test its merits the results are presented in
the next section.
9.4.1 Security
The security of this method was found to be excellent. We made the tolerance level less
than 3.0 to produce blocks that were very similar to the original.
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Figure 34. Fractal Based DCT: Modified pixels v.v original values
The modified pixel values are very close to the original. The pixel run test were applied to 
the resulting image as well and there is no statistical reason to point a cryptanalyst at a 
particular modified block.
9.4.2 R obustness
We first of determined the minimum value for corrmin for this technique by taking a set 
of images and matching blocks at random and so determine values for r which could 
occur during information retrieval.
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Plot of R values
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Random Matched Domain and Range Blocks
Figure 35. Fractal based DCT: Calculating value for corrmjn
For the experiments the minimum value for corrmin was determined to be 0.991. 
However it is still possible to match two blocks at random and get a value for corrm\n 
greater than 0.991. The minimum correlation coefficient in this case proved to be very 
close to the maximum possible which is 1.
Thus this value for corrm\n gives very little room for error. In practice many spurious 
block matches occurred during retrieval.
9.4.3 Conclusions
This technique proved to be of little assistance in retrieving the hidden information in a 
multimedia environment.
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9.5 Marking U sed R an g e B lo ck s.
Another use of the DCT and quantization processes in our algorithm would be to mark
the used and unused range blocks by modifying components of the high order frequencies
in a predefined manner.
The algorithm of this section is as follows:-
• We partition the image into 8x8 blocks using the quadtree method for use by the DCT 
transform.
• We select a range block from one of these 8x8 blocks and we find a matching domain 
block as described in chapter 6.
• We build a new range block as described in chapter 6.
• We now DCT transform the 8x8 block which contains the modified range block and 
mark it by modifying components of the high order frequencies in a predefined 
manner56. In the process of marking we modify the high frequency components so that 
we can use them to store bits of the steganographic data.
• We reverse the DCT process for the block.
• We realign the linear relationship between the domain and the range block. This will
not effect the marking o f the block. That is the realignment of the linear relationship 
has little effect on the high order coefficients.
• We mark all unused range blocks in a manner which indicates that they are unused.
On retrieval we look for used range blocks. When one is found
• We retrieve the marked bits.
• We then search for a domain block in the usual manner.
9.5.1 Security
The security concerns here were on two levels:
1. The marking of the domain blocks could be discovered.
2. The use of our algorithm in hiding extra bits of steganographic data.
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The sequrity issues here were insurmountable, that is:- the marking of the range blocks 
could be discovered with knowledge of the algorithm by DCT transforming the entire 
image and observing published mark details in the resulting DCT blocks.
9.5.2 R obustness
On an initial investigation the algorithm proved to be robust allowing the value for 
cori'min t0 faU to 8.5. Allowing an average error o f ±6. However because of the security 
issues further tests were not performed to determine the reliability of these results.
9.5.3 Conclusions





Enhancing the Steganographic Ability of the Method
In this chapter we view our algorithm as a purely steganographic method. Enhancement 
to our algorithm are investigated which have the following properties
• We emphases the steganographic properties of the algorithm.
In this chapter we make the assumption that the algorithm is only going to be used 
as a steganographic method. Therefore we can adjust the corrmin value to suit the 
steganographic data, the position and composition of the range and domain 
regions.
• We relax the requirement of the steganographic data to survive in multimedia 
environments.
In chapter 9 we looked at enhancements to our algorithm that help the 
steganographic data to survive being corrupted. The technique looked at in this 
chapter allows some corruption to the steganographic image file. But we assume 
that the image file will remain uncorrupted.
10 .1  Steg an o g rap h ic En hancem ent
In this section we look at the parts of our algorithm as described in chapter 6 that are to be 
enhanced. We present each enhancement by describing the part of our original algorithm
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that is to be enhanced. We then look at the modifications to be made to our original 
algorithm.
The objective of the enhancements is to add further complexity into the cryptanalysis 
process. The enhancements are as follows:-
• Reduce the value for corrmjn for the range and domain region.
After inserting our steganographic data into a range region. We introduce noise57 
into the whole image. The correlation coefficient between a modified range and a 
domain block will have decreased. Therefore we must do a recalculation of 
c°rrmin f°r the modified range blocks so that we will find all modified range 
blocks during the retrieval process.
By reducing the value for corrmjn it causes lots more potential spurious hidden 
messages to occur during cryptanalysis. As stated in Chapter 8 we assume that a 
cryptanalyst knows that our algorithm has been applied to a particular image. 
Therefore in order for the cryptanalyst to find all hidden bits he has to use a low 
value of corrmin.
By using a lower value for corrmin than 9.6 ( see chapter 7 ) the cryptanalyst 
would find spurious block matches all over the steganographic image file. The 
cryptanalyst would even discover spurious block matches in regions of our bogus 
messages. There are various techniques for inserting noise into images58. However 
in our case the noise we insert does not contain any data and so the discovery of 
the noise itself does not cause us a problem.
These bogus messages and spurious block matches will not effect our user 
because he knows the range and domain regions. We can even have our corrm[n 
as a user input. This would allow us to decrease the value for corrm\n even lower. 
Making cryptanalysis even more difficult. However the corrmjn value may not be 
suitable as a user input because it is a real number. However that being said the 
user would just have to remember a number like 8.7.
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• Place lots of bogus messages into the steganographic image file.
The cryptanalyst will have to show that each discovered message is bogus before 
continuing. This becomes an exceptionally long process if  each bogus message is 
encrypted.
•  Match unused blocks with domain blocks that are not in the domain library.
When hiding a one bit of steganographic data we search either Do or D] for a 
matching domain block. If we don’t find such a matching block, the range block is 
unused. We call this unused range block RUnused-
We now match Runused with a domain block Dfounci  from a separate domain 
library say D2 . D2  is made up of domain blocks that are not in the domain region. 
We replace the RUnused with a similar block RlJnusedNew  pixels in 
RjjnusedNew  are built by applying the scaling and offset factors to the 
corresponding pixels o f Dfound as described in Chapter 6.
This procedure causes confusion to the cryptanalyst because if he finds the correct 
range region. Then he will think that he has lots of potential domain regions. Each 
of these potential domain regions has to be verified.
We cannot use this procedure when the range blocks are distributed as described 
in 8.4 above.
10 .2  S e cu rity  a n a ly s is
The above enhancements were added to our algorithm and the results are presented in this 
section.
Several bogus messages were inserted into a test image. We then inserted our 
steganographic data and random noise. We found that the corrm\n value was 8.9. We then 
selected a series of range and corresponding domain regions in the image. We then tried
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to match 40 random range blocks against corresponding random domain blocks from the 
regions. For the matching process we set the corrm\n value to 9.4. We noted how many 
spurious matches occurred. The results are presented in the next graph.
Plot range and domain block matches
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Figure 36A. Steganographic enhancements: Plot of spurious range and domain matches
The results were that for 50 matches of a random range block with a random domain 
block there were on average 14 matches.
These results show that a cryptanalyst can expect on average « 30% of his range and 
domain blocks to give a match. These results are with corrmjn at too large a value to 
retrieve the steganographic data. In this case even if the cryptanalyst was to chose the 
correct range and domain blocks he would loose bits of the steganographic data.
Again several bogus messages were inserted into a test image. We then inserted our 
steganographic data and random noise. We found that the corrmin value was 8.8. We then 
selected a series of range and corresponding domain regions in the image. We then tried
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to match 40 random range blocks against corresponding random domain blocks from the 
regions. For the matching process we set the corrmin value to 8.8. We noted how many 
spurious matches occurred. The results are presented in the next graph.
Plot spurious range and domain block matches
40 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0  , , ,  ..... ......... ..... ........... „I*«— u-nnnm;m * <  ----------------
t- o c d c o  r ^ - ( £ > i n N j - o o c M ' t - o  o o o n . c o l o ^ c o c m
t- t- C M  C Q ^ L O C O h - O O C D O  O - r - C N J C O ^ L O C D r - -
random domain and range region num ber
Figure 36B. Steganographic Enhancements: Plot of spurious range and domain matches
The results were that for 50 matches of a random range block with a random domain 
block, there were on average 22 spurious matches.
These results show that a cryptanalyst can expect on average «  44% of his range and 
domain blocks to give a match. These results are with corrmin at the correct value.
These results prove that while a cryptanalyst is searching for the correct range and 
domain regions then he will find many matching range and domain blocks. Each of these 
range and domain regions that the cryptanalyst tries will produce a bogus message. Some 
of these bogus messages have been placed by us but the majority are random.
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10.3 Conclusions
I f  we are not using distributed blocks see 8.4 above then we draw the following 
conclusion
The algorithm gives excellent security provided the cryptanalyst does not by luck select 
the correct domain and range regions. If  the cryptanalyst does select the correct domain 
and range regions then our only means of security is that the cryptanalyst has chosen the 
correct value for corrmin.
With distributed blocks combined with added noise to reduce the value of corrmjn then as 
described in 8.4 above the cryptanalyst would have
1024*1023*1022
possible choices for the pixels of a range block. This value would now have to be 
multiplied by the number of possible choices for corrmin. As corrmin is a real number it 
potentially has many possible choices. For each value of corrmin that is too high the 
retrieval process will loose bits of the steganographic data. Each value of corrmfn that is 
too low will have a spurious bits contained in it. The cryptanalyst has to be able to 





This chapter draws conclusions from the work on this thesis. We describe how useful our 
method is for data hiding. We also discuss the method’s limitations.
The conclusions we draw from this research is as follows:-
• The method is excellent as a steganographic technique. It provides several means of 
security. Each of these are similar to a combination lock that is placed on the hidden 
information. Each lock will have be cracked. The following locks have to cracked in 
every cryptanalysis
1. The position and shape of the range and domain regions. These can be selected by 
the user.
2. The size and relationship between the range and domain regions.
3. The use of distributed blocks.
4. The correct selection o f the corrmjn factor.
Here we assume that the cryptanalyst is looking through the steganographic image file 
for the correct range and domain region. Given selected range and domain regions 
which are not the correct ones then the following locks have to be cracked
1. The spurious block matches. This will cause the cryptanalyst to incorrectly 
retrieve a spurious hidden message. Each bogus message has to be discarded. 
These bogus messages would be simply noise.
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2. The retrieval of actual bogus messages placed in random range regions by the 
user. These messages would not be noise and so the cryptanalyst would have a 
more difficult job in eliminating these messages.
• Computer based steganography is becoming increasingly important in this era of 
world-wide communications. One o f the major advantages of steganography is that it 
can easily be combined with traditional cryptographic methods. This would give two 
levels of security. Our method can be easily combined with a cryptographic method. 
The data could be encrypted first before being hidden into an image.
• Multimedia document labelling is also of major importance in today’s world. It is 
very easy to illicitly duplicate multimedia documents and distributed them. Hiding a 
steganographic label into an important multimedia document would ease this 
problem. Steganography would seem to be one of the only solutions to this problem 
as the document itself contains an innocuous label. Our method is suited to labelling 
because such a label is typically short. However it is not possible to adapt the method 
so that the steganographic information will survive through major lossy image 
processing.
• The amount of data one can store is small. It is only possible to store one bit per range 
block. This can be increased if the tolerance level is relaxed. Some ranges cannot be 
covered when the tolerance is low. Increasing the tolerance level would allow us to 
use all range blocks in the range region given an increase in the amount of 
steganographic data that can be stored. However we would normally require the 
tolerance to be low in order to give an image that is visually close to the original.
The range region cannot overlap the domain region; because the range region gets 
modified and we need the domain region to remain unmodified. This restricts the 
amount of steganographic data that can be stored. However the bigger the range 
region is the more data that can be stored. But there has to be a compromise as to the 
size of the domain region. The smaller the domain region is the worse the quality of 
the produced image will be.
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• The process of data hiding is slow. It depends on the amount of steganographic data 
and how high the tolerance is set. The time taken also depends very much on the size 
of the domain region. But the bigger the domain region the better the quality of the 
produced image. The data retrieving is even slower this is because the comparison 
processes is more intensive.
• It is possible to distribute the range and domain blocks throughout the regions. This 
means that a block is made up a pseudo random set of pixels taken from different parts 
o f the region. The only limitation required is that a pixel only belongs to one range 
block. A range and domain block may be distributed. If this scheme of things was 
implemented then it would yield a vast amount o f searches for the cryptanalyst.
128
Bibliography
1. Schnieder, A p p l i e d  C r y p t o g r a p h y , W i l e y ,  1993
2. E. Franz et al, Computer Based Steganography, Information Hiding Workshop, University of 
Cambridge, May 1996, Lecture notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1996, 3-540-61996-8
3. R. Anderson, Stretching the Limits of Steganography, Information Hiding Workshop, University of 
Cambridge, May 1996, Lecture notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1996, 3-540-61996-8
4. M. Barnsley, Fractal Image Compression, AK Peters, 1993, 1-56881-000-8
5. E. Koch, J. Zhao, Embedding Robust Labels into Images fo r  Copyright Protection, Proc. of the
International Congress on Intellectual Property Rights for Specialized Information, Vienna, Austria, 
Aug 1995
6. David Kahn, The Codebreakers, Macmillan Publishing, 1967
7. David Kahn, The History o f Steganography, Information Hiding Workshop, University of Cambridge,
May 1996, Lecture notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1996, 3-540-61996-8
8. Netcom.com , /pub/qwerty, FTP site for reviewed software
9. E. Franz et al, Computer Based Steganography, Information Hiding Workshop, University of
Cambridge, May 1996, Lecture notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1996, 3-540-61996-8
10. E. Koch, J. Rindfrey, J. Zhao, Copright Protection fo r Multimedia Data, Proceedings of the
International Conference on Digital Media and Electronic Publishing, Dec 1994, Leeds UK
11. E. Koch , J. Zhao, Towards Robust and Hidden Image Copyright Labelling, Proc. of 1995 Workshop 
on Nonlinear Signal and Image Processing, Neos Marmaras, Greece, June, 1995
12. E. Koch, J. Zhao, Embedding Robust Labels into Images fo r Copyright Protection, Proc. of the 
International Congress on Intellectual Property Rights for Specialized Information, Vienna, Austria, 
Aug 1995
13. B. Kahin, The strategic environment fo r  protecting multimedia, IMA Intellectual Property Project 
Proceeding, vol 1, no. 1, 1994
14. K. Matusi, K. Tanaka, Video Steganography: How to secretly embed a signature in a picture, IMA 
intellectual Property Project Proceedings, vol. 1, no. 1,1994
15. G. Wallace, The JPEG still picture compression standard, Communications of the ACM, vol 34, no.4, 
April 1991
16. R. Dixon, Spread Spectrum Systems, 2nd ed.,Wiley, New York, NY, 1984
17. J. Brassil, S.Low, N. Maxemchuk, Electronic Marking and Identification Techniques to Discourage 
Document Copying, AT&T Bell Labs, Murray Hill, NJ
18. A. Choudhury, N. Maxemchuk, S. Paul, Copyright Protection fo r  Electronic Publishing over Computer 
Networks, AT&T Bell Labs, June 1994
19. T. Handel, Hiding data in the OSI Network Model, Information Hiding Workshop, University of 
Cambridge, May 1996, Lecture notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1996, 3-540-61996-8
129
20. E. Franz et al., C o m p u t e r  B a s e d  S t e g a n o g r a p h y  information Hiding Workshop, University of 
Cambridge, May 1996, Lecture notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1996, 3-540-61996-8
21. D. Gruhl et al, E c h o  H i d i n g ,  Information Hiding Workshop, University of Cambridge, May 1996, 
Lecture notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1996, 3-540-61996-8
22. Y. Fisher, F r a c t a l  I m a g e  C o m p r e s s i o n  T h e o r y  a n d  A p p l i c a t i o n ,  Chapter 1, Springer-Verlag, 1995, 0- 
387942114
23. M. Barnsley, F r a c t a l  I m a g e  C o m p r e s s i o n ,  AK Peters, 1993, 1-56881-000-8
24. J. Hutchinson, F r a c t a l s  a n d  S e l f  S i m i l a r i t y ,  Indiana University Mathematics Journal, Vol 35, No. 5, 
1981
25. M. Barnsley, F r a c t a l s  E v e r y w h e r e ,  Academic Press, 1993, 0-12-079061-0
26. H. Peitgen, D.Saupe, H. Jurgens, Springer Verlag, F r a c t a l s  f o r  t h e  C l a s s  R o o m ,  New York, 1991
27. M.Barnsley, L. Hurd, F r a c t a l  I m a g e  C o m p r e s s i o n ,  1993, AK Peters, 1-56881-000-8
28. J. Hutchinson, F r a c t a l s  a n d  S e l f  S i m i l a r i t y ,  Indiana University Mathematics Journal, Vol 35, No. 5, 
1981
29. Y. Fisher, F r a c t a l  I m a g e  C o m p r e s s i o n ,  SIGGRAPH’92 Course Notes
30. A. Rosenfeld, M u l t i r e s o l u t i o n  I m a g e  P r o c e s s i n g  a n d  A n a l y s i s ,  Springer-Verlag
31. A.Jacquin, A  F r a c t a l  T h e o r y  o f  I t e r a t e d  M a r k o v  O p e r a t o r s  w i t h  A p p l i c a t i o n s  t o  D i g i t a l  I m a g e  C o d i n g ,  
Phd Thesis, Georgia Institute o f Technology, 1989
32. Y. Fisher, E.W. Jacobs, F r a c t a l  I m a g e  C o m p r e s s i o n  U s i n g  I t e r a t e d  T r a n s f o r m s ,  NOSC Technical 
Report, Naval Ocean Systems Center, San Diego CA 92152-5000
33. M. Spiegel, P r o b a b i l i t y  a n d  S t a t i s t i c s ,  Schaum’s outline series, McGraw Hill, Chapter 8
34. W. Press et al, N u m e r i c a l  R e c i p e s ,  Cambridge University Press, 0-521-30811-9, 1989, Chapter 14
35. E. Kreyszig, A d v a n c e d  E n g i n e e r i n g  M a t h e m a t i c s  , Wiley, 1989
36. F. Schied, Numerical Analysis, Schaum’s Outline Series, Chapter 21, McGraw Hill, 07-055197-9, 1968
37. M. Spiegel, P r o b a b i l i t y  a n d  S t a t i s t i c s ,  Schaum’s outline series, Chapter 5, page 160
38. M. Spiegel, P r o b a b i l i t y  a n d  S t a t i s t i c s ,  Schaum’s outline series, Chapter 3, page 81
39. M. Spiegel, P r o b a b i l i t y  a n d  S t a t i s t i c s ,  Schaum’s outline series, Chapter 8, page 263
40. M. Spiegel, P r o b a b i l i t y  a n d  S t a t i s t i c s ,  Schaum’s outline series, Chapter 8,page 262
41. M. Nelson, The Data Compression Book, M&T books, 1991
42. Y. Fisher, F r a c t a l  I m a g e  C o m p r e s s i o n  T h e o r y  a n d  A p p l i c a t i o n ,  Springer-Verlag, 0-387942114, 1995
4 3 .1. Pitas & A. Venetsanopoulos, Nonlinear Digital Filters, Kluwer Academic, 1990
44. H. Myler & A. Weeks, C o m p u t e r  I m a g i n g  r e c i p e s ,  Prentice Hall,1993,0-13-189879-5
45. Y. Fisher, E.W. Jacobs, F r a c t a l  I m a g e  C o m p r e s s i o n  U s i n g  I t e r a t e d  T r a n s f o r m s ,  NOSC Technical 
Report, Naval Ocean Systems Center, San Diego CA 92152-5000
46. Y. Fisher, F r a c t a l  I m a g e  C o m p r e s s i o n  T h e o r y  a n d  A p p l i c a t i o n ,  Chapter 1, Springer-Verlag,0- 
387942114
47. Y. Fisher, E.W. Jacobs, F r a c t a l  I m a g e  C o m p r e s s i o n  U s i n g  I t e r a t e d  T r a n s f o r m s ,  NOSC Technical 
Report, Naval Ocean Systems Center, San Diego CA 92152-5000
130
48. Y. Fisher, F r a c t a l  I m a g e  C o m p r e s s i o n  T h e o r y  a n d  A p p l i c a t i o n ,  Chapter 3, Springer-Verlag, 0- 
387942114, 1995
49. T. Aura, Practical invisibility in digital communications, Information Hiding Workshop, University of 
Cambridge, May 1996, May ’96, Lecture notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1996, 3-540- 
61996-8
50. M. Sonka et al., Image Processing, Analysis and Machine Vision, Chapman & Hall,1994, 0-412- 
45570-6
51. Y. Fisher, F r a c t a l  I m a g e  C o m p r e s s i o n  T h e o r y  a n d  A p p l i c a t i o n ,  Chapter 6, Springer-Verlag,0- 
387942114
5 2 .1. Cox et al, A  S e c u r e ,  R o b u s t  W a t e r m a r k  f o r  M u l t i m e d i a ,  Workshop on Information Hiding, Univ. of 
Cambridge, May ’96, Lecture notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1996, 3-540-61996-8
5 3 .1. Cox et al, A  S e c u r e ,  R o b u s t  W a t e r m a r k  f o r  M u l t i m e d i a ,  Workshop on Information Hiding, Univ. of 
Cambridge, May ’96, Lecture notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1996, 3-540-61996-8
54. J. Smith, Modulation and Information Hiding in Images, Workshop on Information Hiding, Univ. of 
Cambridge, May ’96, Lecture notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1996, 3-540-61996-8
5 5 .1. Cox et al, A  S e c u r e ,  R o b u s t  W a t e r m a r k  f o r  M u l t i m e d i a ,  Workshop on Information Hiding, Univ. of 
Cambridge, May ’96, Lecture notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1996, 3-540-61996-8
56. J. Zhao et al, E m b e d d i n g  r o b u s t  l a b e l s  i n t o  i m a g e s  f o r  c o p y r i g h t  p r o t e c t i o n ,  Information, knowledge 
and New technologies conference, Vienna Aug 21-25
57. M. Sandford, The data embedding method, Proceedings o f the SPIE Photonics Conference, 
Philadelphia, Sept 1995
58. T. Aura, Practical invisibility in digital communications, Information Hiding Workshop, University of 
Cambridge, May 1996, May ’96, Lecture notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1996, 3-540- 
61996-8
59. D. Kruglinski, I n s i d e  V i s u a l  C + + ,  Microsoft Press,1996,155615-891-2
60. J. Smith, Modulation and Information Hiding in Images, Workshop on Information Hiding, Univ. of 
Cambridge, May ’96, Lecture notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1996, 3-540-61996-8
61. H. Myler & A. Weeks, C o m p u t e r  I m a g i n g  r e c i p e s ,  Prentice Hall, 1993,0-13-189879-5
62. Shannon and Weaver, T h e  M a t h e m a t i c a l  T h e o r y  o f  C o m m u n i c a t i o n ,  The University o f Illinois Press, 
1949.
63. Stallings, D a t a  a n d  C o m p u t e r  C o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,  Macmillian.
64. D. Kruglinski, I n s i d e  V i s u a l  C++, Microsoft Press,1996,155615-891-2
131
Appendix A. Proof of Concept
Appendix A 
Proof of Concept
In this appendix we look at implementation of our algorithm as a proof of concept. The 
application which we called Frasteg is used as a proof of concept. All testing was 
performed using Frasteg.
Frasteg allows a user to hide steganographic data into a 256 level grey scale bitmap. It 
builds a new bitmap which is visually identical to the original. This new bitmap will have 
the required steganographic data hidden in it. Frasteg also allows a user to retrieve 
steganographic data from a bitmap file.
Frasteg was designed in an object oriented manner. The implementation was in Visual 
C++. Frasteg uses full Visual C++ architectures. Therefore Visual C++ terminology will 
be used in the description. Visual C++ was chosen because it assists in developing 
industrial strength Windows based applications.
A .1 T he Frasteg U se r Interface
Frasteg is a MS-Windows based application and as such has the standard menu driven 
user interface.
One must first of all open a bitmap file. You do this with the File Open menu option. 
Figure 4 shows an example bitmap (girl.bmp) opened and displayed in a child window.
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FRASTEG Windows Application - G IRL.BMP
File Edit View Steganography Window Help
Figure 37. Frasteg User Interface
The user can now select the menu option steganography. This menu option has two sub­
menu options associated with it.
• The Add steganographic data option allows a user to add steganographic data to the
bitmap and store the result in a new bitmap. When this option is selected the user is
presented with the standard Windows file save dialog. This dialog specifies the new 
bitmap file that is to be created. When the user has successfully selected a file name 
he/she is presented with another dialog box. This dialog allows the user to enter the 
steganographic data that is to be hidden into the new bitmap file.
When the steganographic data is entered and the OK button selected the data hiding 
process begins. Status messages are displayed to the user to indicate progress. When 
data hiding is completed a dialog box is displayed to the user which indicates the 
number o f bytes that were successfully hidden.
• The Get steganographic data menu option allows a user to retrieve steganographic
data from the bitmap. When this option is selected the revealing process begins.
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Status messages are displayed to the user to indicate progress. When the revealing 
process completes a dialog box is presented to the user which shows the 
steganographic data.
A .2  The C D ib  c la s s
The CDib class contains the code and data for manipulating DIBs (Device Independant 
Bitmap). MFC has no class for manipulating DIBs. So we had to write code to 
manipulate the DIB. There are examples of how to do this in Kruglinski59. A CDib object 
represents a single device-independent bitmap. The image bits together with all necessary 
decoding information are contained within this object. The image bits are maintained in a 
HUGE array. Frasteg does not limit the size of the bitmap so this array can be very large.
The CDib object also contains information on the DIB. For example :- the number of 
colours, its width, its height etc. The reason these are stored here is that if we were to 
access them by means of the DIB header then we would have to lock the DIB memory get 
the information and then release the DIB memory again.
The CDib object contains a number of member functions. For example :-
• Read and Write members for serializing (reading/writing to disk) the DIB.
• Constructor and destructor for initialising and cleaning up the CDib object.
• Display function sends the CDib object to the display (or printer) without creating an 
intermediate GDI bitmap.
• There are member functions for returning the read only information from the CDib 
object. For example Get Length returns the length of the DIB.
A .3  Frasteg - The C o d e  Form at
Skeleton code for Frasteg was built using the AppWizard tool that is supplied with Visual 
C++. A Multiple Document Interface (MDI) application was chosen. A MDI application
3
Appendix A. Proof of Concept
allows multiple documents and multiple views o f each document. The skeleton’s 
structure is based on a standard MFC based application.
A.3.1 M FC  class h ierarchy as applied to Frasteg
Taken together, the classes in MFC make up an application framework. That is the 
framework on which one builds an application for Windows. A programmers work with 
MFC is based largely on a few major classes and several C++ tools.
In any MFC based application a programmer will derive classes from several key MFC 
classes. In a running MFC based application a programmer will then have the following 
key objects
• The document(s)
The document class (derived from MFC’s CDocument) specifies the application’s 
data. In Frasteg the data is an array which holds the pixel intensity values for the 
bitmap. A user of Frasteg may have many bitmaps open at any given time, each of 
these will have a CDocument object associated with it. See Appendix C, section 
C l.
• The view(s)
The view class (derived from MFC’s CView) is the user’s window on the data. 
The view class specifies how the user sees the document’s data and interacts with 
it. In Frasteg this class describes how to present the bitmap to the user. The 
OnDraw member of the view class redraws the current bitmap whenever the user 
does something which invalidates it. For example if  the user minimises the 
window.
•  The frame windows
Views are displayed inside document frame windows. In an MDI application, 
document frame windows are child windows displayed inside a main frame 
window (derived from CMDIFrameWnd).
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• The document template(s)
A document template causes the creation of documents, views and frame 
windows. A particular document-template class creates and manages all open 
documents of one type. Derive from CMultiDocTemplate for MDI applications. 
There is one document template in Frasteg. This document template causes a 
document and a view object to be created whenever a user opens a bitmap file.
• The application object
The application class (derived from CWinApp) controls all of the above objects.
A .3.2 D ocum ent-V iew  m odel.
One of the most important features of an MFC based application is the division of labour 
between document and view objects. In a MFC based application the document-view 
programming model is used to separate the management of the data and the displaying of 
that data to the user.
A document object contains and manages the data in Frasteg. The document object 
contains many data members that are associated with the opened bitmap. From the user's 
standpoint the document is the data that user is manipulating. From the programmers 
standpoint the document is a C++ object of a class derived from the MFC library 
CDocument class. In Frasteg the document object contains message handling functions 
which are called when the user selects Add steganographic data and Get steganographic 
data; See Appendix C, section C l. MFC causes associated member functions to be called 
in response to theses menu options.
The view object displays the data and allows editing. From the user's standpoint, a view is 
an ordinary window that he/she can size, move etc. in the same way as any other 
Windows-based application window. From the standpoint of the programmer, a view is a 
C++ object of a class derived from the MFC library CView class.
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A .3.4 H iding and retrieving the steganographic data
Frasteg follows the algorithms as outlined in section 3.1 above. But generalises them into
the following
• Selecting a range block r\ is in the order of the quadtree fractal compression 
algorithm.
• The SelectedRanges set is made up of the smallest range blocks defined by the 
quadtree algorithm, this allows us to hide more steganographic data. However if larger 
blocks were used it would make it more difficult for a cryptanalyst to crack the data 
hiding. This is because there would now be less likely that statistical analysis could be 
successfully applied to the images which have steganographic data hidden in them.
• We need to be able to get the next bit from this stream. In Frasteg Steg is an object of 
the C++ class StegData. It has an overloaded operator »  defined which gives the 
next bit in the stream. This operator takes a StegData object and a character variable 
as parameters. The result of this operation is 0 if the end of the bit stream is reached 
otherwise the result is 1. A class StegData also has an overloaded operator «  defined 
which adds a bit to a stream. This operator is used when retrieving the steganographic 
data. See Stegan Module in Appendix C, section C4 for details.
6
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Appendix B 
Information Theory vs. Hiding Bandwidth
In this Appendix we document our attempt to apply information theory to our hiding 
algorithm. The main focus of this effort was to discover the theoretical limits on the data 
hiding bandwidth. The main source of the ideas in this section were presented in the 
paper by Smith60.
B .1 Introduction
To apply information theory to our steganographic algorithm we consider:-
• The original image as a noisy channel.
• The steganographic data as the signal.
• The hiding algorithm as a modulator.
• The revealing algorithm as a demodulator.
Steganoeraphic Channel Steeanoeraphic ^
information in information out
Figure 38. Steganographic algorithm as a communication system
B .2  S teg an o g rap h ic Algorithm  a s  a C o m m u n icatio n s System
We have a number of ways to apply this communication system to our algorithm:-
• To the whole image, with all of the steganographic information as signal.
1
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• To individual range blocks, with one bit o f steganographic information as signal.
• To individual pixels in the range block and the amount information that an individual 
pixel can carry.
The channel capacity is the maximum rate at which a channel can carry information 
without error. We view the image as being subject to Gaussian noise61, and for a channel 
subject to this type of noise the channel capacity is (from shannon’s theorem62) given by:-
However the bandwidth here indicates the range of frequencies which can be successfully 
transmitted over a communications channel, and as such is measured in hertz. Therefore 
the image needs to be converted into the frequency domain in order to apply this formula 
in the traditional manner.
Our algorithm is a spatial domain method, and there seems to be no way of viewing the 
hiding algorithm as a modulator and the retrieval algorithm as a demodulator. This is 
because traditional modulation methods are amplitude, frequency and phase63. These are 
all based in the frequency domain.
Where, W is the bandwidth, and S/N is the signal to noise ratio.
For data hiding the noise is the original image and the signal is the steganographic data.
2
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Appendix C 
Proof of Concept Code
This Appendix lists the main code sections for the proof of concept application (Frasteg). 
The code was written in Visual C++. Visual C++ was choosen as an implementation 
framework, because it assists in building industrial strength applications.
We give an index into the code main code sections. The pseudo code for our algorithm in 
Chapter 1, references this index. Appendix A gives a more high level overview of the 
proof of concept implementation.
All the code for Frasteg is on the attached floppy disk. The floppy disk also includes 
further code associated with the techniques of chapter 9.
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C .1  Index Into The C o d e
Average Functions
Convert Domain block size to range size  157
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Appendix C. The Code
C .2  The D ocum ent C o d e
/* The CStegDoc module.
This module has code:-
1. For converting the BMP file into a large array of pixel values each pixel 
value is 0-256 in grey level.
2. Menu handling code which is called by MFC when the user selects 
Hiding/retrieving options.*/




















C StegDoc : : CStegDoc()
{
m_hDIB = NULL; 
m jalD IB  = NULL; 
hsize = vsize = -1;
m sizeDoc = CSize(l, 1); // dummy value to make CScrollView happy
}// Document Destructor
CStegDoc: :~CStegDoc()
{ if (m hDIB != NULL)
{ : : GlobalFree((HGLOB AL) m hDIB);
}
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/* BMP Initialise function */
void CStegDoc::InitDIBData()
{
if  (m_palDIB !=NULL)
{ delete m_palDIB; 
m_palDIB = NULL;
}
if (m hD IB == NULL)
{ return;
}// Set up document size
LPSTR lpDIB = (LPSTR) ::GlobalLock((HGLOBAL) m_hDIB); 
cxDIB = (int) : : DIB Width(lpDIB); // Size of DIB - x
cyDIB = (int) ::DIBHeight(lpDIB); // Size of DIB - y
m sizeDoc = CSize(cxDIB, cyDIB);
if (::DIBWidth(lpDIB) > INT MAX || ::DIBHeight(lpDIB) > INT MAX)
{ : : GlobalUnlock((HGLOB AL) m hDIB);
::GlobalFree((HGLOBAL) m hDIB); 
m_hDIB = NULL;
MessageBox(NULL. "DIB is too large", NULL,




// Create copy of palette 
m_palDIB = new CPalette; 
if (mjsalDIB == NULL)
{ // we must be really low on memory 
::GlobalFree((HGLOBAL) m hDIB); 
m hD IB = NULL; 
return;
}if (::CreateDIBPalette(mJiDIB, m_palDIB) == NULL)
{ // DIB may not have a palette 
delete m_palDIB; 




/* BMP Open function */




if (!file.Open(pszPathName, CFile::modeRead | CFile::shareDenyWrite, &fe))
{ ReportSaveLoadException(pszPathName, &fe,
FALSE, AFX IDP_FAILLD TO_OPEN DOC); 
return FALSE;
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DeleteContentsO;
BeginWaitCursor();
// replace calls to Serialize with ReadDIBFile function 
TRY 
{ m hD IB  = ::ReadDIBFile(file,bmfHeader);
}CATCH (CFileException, eLoad)









if (m hDIB == NULL)
{ // may not be DIB format
MessageBox(NULL, "Couldn't load DIB", NULL,
MB ICONINFORMATION | MB OK);
return FALSE;
}SetPathName(pszPathName);
SetModifiedFlag(FALSE); // start off with unmodified 
return TRUE;
/* BMP Save function */
BOOL CStegDoc::OnSaveDocument(const char* pszPathName)
{ CFile file;
CFileException fe;
if (!file.Open(pszPathName, CFile:imodeCreate |
CFile::modeReadWrite | CFile::shareExclusive, &fe))
{ ReportSaveLoadException(pszPathName, &fe,
TRUE, AFX_IDP_INVALID FILENAME); 
return FALSE;
}
// replace calls to Serialize with SaveDIB function 
BOOL bSuccess =  FALSE;
TRY
{ BeginWaitCursor();
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CATCH (CException, eSave)
{ file.Abort(); // will not throw an exception 
EndWaitCursor();
ReportSaveLoadException(pszPathName, eSave,





SetModifiedFlag(FALSE); // back to unmodified
if  (IbSuccess)
{ // may be other-style DIB (load supported but not save)
// or other problem in SaveDIB 
MessageBox(NULL, "Couldn't save DIB", NULL,




/* Function to convert a BMP format file into internal representation. Internal representation
is a 2D array o f pixel values. */
void CStegDoc::RGBtoImage(int Insert)
{ WORD wNumColors; // number of colors in color table
LPSTR lpbi; // pointer to packed-DIB
LPBITMAPINFO lpbmi; // pointer to BITMAPINFO structure (Win3.0) 
LPBITMAPCOREINFO lpbmc; // pointer to BITMAPCOREINFO structure (old) 
BOOL bWinStyleDIB; // flag which signifies whether this is a Win3.0 DIB
LPSTR lpDIBHdr; // Pointer to BITMAPINFOHEADER











I *  if handle to DIB is invalid, return FALSE */
if (m hDIB == NULL) 
return;
lpbi = (LPSTR) ::GlobalLock((HGLOBAL) m hDIB);
lpDIBBits = (BYTE *) ::FindDIBBits(lpbi); / *  get pointer to BITMAPINFO (Win 3.0) */
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lpbmi = (LPBITMAPINFO)lpbi;
/* get pointer to BITMAPCOREINFO (old 1 .x) */ 
lpbmc = (LPBITMAPCOREINFO)lpbi;
noColours = DIBNumColors(lpbi);
FILE *fp = fopen("input.bit","wb");
/* is this a Win 3.0 DIB? */ 
if  (bWinStyleDIB = IS_WIN30_DIB(lpbi))
{










if  ( Insert)
fwrite(lpbmc,sizeof(BITMAPCOREHEADER), 1,output);
// fwrite(lpbmc->bmciColors,sizeof(RGBTRIPLE), noColours, output);
rt = (RGBTRIPLE *)((LPSTR)lpbmc + lpbmc->bmciHeader.bcSize); 
Height = (DWORD)lpbmc->bmciHeader.bcHeight;
Width = (DWORD)lpbmc->bmciHeader.bcWidth;
Nobits=nobits =  lpbmc->bmciHeader.bcBitCount;
}
/* Find colours in the colour map. */ 
cnt =0 ; 
if  ( Insert) {






Blue = rq[i].rgbBlue; 









Blue = rt[i].rgbtBlue; 














svsize = hsize = Width; 
svsize = vsize = Height;
if  (lalloced) {




/* Go through the image data; image data consists of an index into the colour table and using index 
find the appropriate colour. */
for (i = 0; i < Height; i++)
{
for (j=0;j < W idth;j++)
{
switch (nobits) { 
case 1:
if ( bitcnt == 8 ) { 
val = *lpDIBBits++; 
bitcnt = 0;
}




if ( bitcnt == 0 ) { 




index = (val »  bitcnt) & 15; 
break;
case 8:
index = *lpDIBBits H-; 
break;





/*C = ((long)Red «  16) | (long)Green «  8 |
(long)Blue; */
Enclmage[i][j] = Red; 
if(fp) 
fputc(Red,fp); 
if  ( Insert)
Declmage[i][j] = Red;
} /* for */
for (;j%4;j++)
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lpDIBBits++;





/* Function to convert internal format into a BMP format file. Internal representation 
is a 2D array of pixel values. */
void CStegDoc::GetBMPFromRGBImage(IMAGE_TYPE **Image,char * bufhead,int siz) 
{
WORD wNumColors; // number o f colors in color table
LPSTR lpbi; // pointer to packed-DIB
LPBITMAPINFO lpbmi; // pointer to B1TMAPINFO structure (Win3.0) 
LPBITMAPCOREINFO lpbmc; // pointer to BITMAPCOREINFO structure (old) 
BOOL bWinStyleDIB; // flag which signifies whether this is a Win3.0 DIB






int nocol = 0;
BYTE ind;
if (m hDIB =  NULL) 
return;
lpbi = (LPSTR) ::GlobalLock((HGLOBAL) m hDIB);
lpDIBBits = (char *) ::FindDIBBits(lpbi);
/* get pointer to BITMAPINFO (Win 3.0) */ 
lpbmi = (LPBITMAPINFO)lpbi;
/* get pointer to BITMAPCOREINFO (old 1 .x) */ 
lpbmc = (LPBITMAPCOREINFO)lpbi;
noColours = DIBNumColors(lpbi);
/* is this a Win 3.0 DIB? */ 
bWinStyleDIB = IS_WIN30_DIB(lpbi);
FILE * fp=fopen("output.bit","wb");
for (i = 0; i < vsize; i++)
{
iprintf(fp,"\n"); 
for (j=0;j < hsize;j++ )
{
Red = Image[i][j]; 
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diffcnt = 0;
for(cnt=0;cnt<noColours;cnt++)
if ( Red =  (r=lpbmi->biniColors[cnt].rgbRed) ) 
break; 
eise
if ((x=(Red-r < 0 ? r-Red: Red-r)) < diff)
{
d iff= x ; 
diffcnt = ent;
}





diff = 254; 
diffcnt = 0;
for(ent=0;ent<noColours;cnt++)
if ( Red =  (iHpbmc->bmciColors[cnt].rgbtRed) ) 
break; 
eise
if ((x=(Red-r < 0 ? r-Red: Red-r)) < diff)
{
diff = x; 
diffcnt = ent;
}
if ( ent == noColours ) 
ent = diffcnt;
}
switch (Nobits) { 
case 1:
if ( bitent =  8 ) { 
fputc(val, output); 
bitent = 0; 
vai = 0;
}




if ( bitent =  0 ) { 
fputc(val, output); 










} /* for */ 
for (J% 4J++)
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fputc(0, output);
} /* for */
if(fp) 
fclose(fp); 
::GlobalUnlock((HGLOBAL) m JiD IB ); 
}
/* Some test steganographic messages. */













/* Event handler for Add steganographic data. */
/* This is the driver code to add steganographic info into the image file. */ 
void CStegDoc::OnSteganographyAdddata()
{










BitmapFile.m oin.lpstrTitle = "Save Bitmap File"; 
BitmapFile.DoModal();
/* Test code comment out. */
for ( int ii=0;ii<l;ii++) {
// EncS.initchar(Keys[ii]);
if ((output = fopen(BitmapFile.GetPathName(), "wb")) == NULL) 
{











/* Delete off buffers */ 
for (i=0;i<svsize;i++) 
delete [] Declmage[i]; 
delete [] Declmage;





sprintf(buff,"Done no bits =%d",countbits);
Print(buff);
}
void CStegDoc::OnUpdateSteganographyAdddata(CCmdUI* pCmdUI) 
{
// TODO: Add your command update UI handler code here 
pCmdUI->Enable();
}
/* Event handler for Get steganographic data. */
/* This is the driver code to get steganographic info from an image file. */
void CStegDoc::OnSteganographyGetdata()
{














// TODO: Add your command update UI handler code here 
pCmdUI->Enable();
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/* Code for manipulating DIB (BMP file) not included. This code was taken from Kruginski64. */
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C .4  The H iding and Retrieving C o d e
# i f n d e f  E N C H
#define ENCH
#define IM AGE_TYPE unsigned char I* may be different in some applications */ 
extern int countbits,Nobits,hsize,vsize,shsize,svsize; 
extern IMAGE TYPE ** Enclmage; 
extern IMAGE TYPE ** Declmage;
/* used for creating the steganographic image file. */
#define matrix_allocate(matrix, hsize, vsize, TYPE) {\
TYPE *imptr; \ 
int _i; \
matrix = (TYPE **)new char [((vsize) *sizeof(TYPE *))];\ 
if (matrix == NULL) \
Fatal("\nNo memory in matrix allocate."); \ 
for C_i = 0; _i<vsize; ++_i, imptr += hsize){ \
matrix[_i] = (TYPE *)new char [hsize * sizeof(TYPE)]; \ 
if  (matrix[_i] =  NULL )\
Fatal("\nNo memory in matrix allocate."); \
}\
}
#define DeleteMatrix(matrix, vsize) {\ 
int i; \
for ( i = 0; _i<vsize; ++_i) { \ 





#deflne SBITS 5 /* number o f bits used to store scale factor */
#define OBITS 7 /* number of bits used to store offset */
#define SYM_OP 3
/* largest square image that fits in image *i 
//define MINPART 4 /* min and max _part determine a range of */
/¿define MAXPART 5 /* Range sizes from h size» m in  to h size»m ax  */
i/define DOMSTEP 1 /* Density of domains relative to size */
//define DOMSTEP TYPE 0 /* Flag for dom_ step a multiplier or divisor */ 
//define DOMTYPE 0 /* Method of generating domain pool 0,1,2.. */
#define POSTPROCESS 1 /* Flag for postprocessing. */
//define NUMITERATIONS 10 /* Number o f decoding iterations used. */
//define OUTPUTPARTITION 0 /* A flag for outputing the partition */
//define ONLYPOSITIVE 0 /* A flag specifying use of positive scaling */
//define SUBCLASSSEARCH 1 /* A flag specifying classes searched */
//define FULLCLASSSEARCH 1 /* A flag specifying classes searched */
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#define INSERTTOL 8.0 /* The tolerance value */
#define CORRm in 0.96 I* CORRmin value */
/* Encgray.cpp
Code for hiding and revealing algorithm s. */
/* The basis o f this module is taken from Yuval Fisher’s Fractal compression code. We include his 
Copyright notice. */
/* Encode a byte image using a fractal scheme with a quadtree partition */
/* */
/* Copyright 1993,1994 Yuval Fisher. All rights reserved. *//* */












extern int alloced; 
extern Stegan EncS; 
extern Stegan DecS; 
unsigned char Thebit; 
int countbits = 0;
IMAGE TYPE ** Declmage; 
extern FILE *testfile,* output; 
void list_free(struct classified_domain * nodenode); 
void list_delete(struct classified domain *node); 
void apply transformations(int);
#defme DEBUG 0 
#define GREYJLEVELS 255
#define bound(a) ((a) < 0.0 ? 0 : ((a)>255.0? 255 : a))
#defme IMAGE_TYPE unsigned char /* may be different in some applications */
/* various function declarations to keep compiler warnings away. ANSI */
/* prototypes can go here, for the hearty. */
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#define swap(a,b,TYPE) {TYPE _temp; _temp=b; b=a; a= _temp;} 
static IMAGE TYPE **Encimage;
IMAGE_TYPE ** Enclmage;
double **domimage[4]; /* Decimated input image used for domains */ 
int Finish = 0;
double max_scale = 1.0; /* Maximum allowable grey level scale factor */
static int paptr = 1, /* how many bits are packed in sum so far */ 
pasum = 0, /* packed bits */
panum_of_packed_bytes = 0; /* total bytes written out */
static int
FirstStegan,
s bits -  SB1TS, /* Number of bits used to store scale factor */ 
o bits = OBITS, /* Number o f bits used to store offset *1 
min_part = M1NPART, /* Min and max part determine a range of */ 
m axp art = MAXPART, /* Range sizes from h size» m in  to hsize»m ax  */ 
d o m step  = DOMSTEP, /* Density of domains relative lo size */ 
dom step_type = DOMSTEPTYPE, /* Flag for dom step a multiplier or divisor */ 
dom type = DOMTYPE, /* Method of generating domain pool 0 ,1,2.. */ 
only_positive = ONLYPOS1TIVE, /* A flag specifying use o f positive scaling */ 
subclass_search = SUBCLASSSOARCH, /* A flag specifying classes searched */ 
fullclass search = FULLCLASSSEARCH, /* A flag specifying classes searched*/
/* Number o f bits to encode domain position. */
/* The const ialpha when alpha *= 0 */
/* The max power of 2 side o f square image */
/* that fits in our input image. */
/* The class_transform gives the transforms */
/* between classification numbers for */
/* negative scaling values, when brightest */
/* becomes darkest, etc... */




/* rot_transform gives the rotations for */
/* domains with negative scalings. */
int rot_transform[2][8] = {7,4,5,6,1,2,3,0, 2,3,0,1,6,7,4,5};
struct transform ation node {
int rx,ry, /* The range position and size in a trans. */
xsize, ysize, 
rrx.rry,
dx,dy; f* The domain position. */
int sym op; /* The symmetry operation used in the trans. */ 
int depth; /* The depth in the quadtree partition. */
double scale, offset; /* sealling and offset values. */ 
double scale 1,offset 1; 
double rms; 
int pos;
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} transformations, *trans,*prev;
struct domain_pixels { /* This is a three (sigh) index array that */
int dom_x, dom_y; /* dynamically allocated. The first index is */
double sum,sum2; /* the domain size, the other are two its */
int sym; /* position. It contains the sum and sumA2 */
};
/* The Domain data structure. */ 
s truc t d o m a in d a ta  {
int *no_h_domains, /* The number of domains horizontally for */
*no_v_domains, /* each size. */
*domain_hsize, /* The size of the domain. */
*domain_vsize, /* The size of the domain. */
* domain Jistep , !* The density of the domains. */
*domain_vstep; /* The density o f the domains. */
domain jnxels*** pixel;/* of the pixel values in the domains, which *! 
} domain; /* are computed just once. */
struct classified_domain { /* This is a list which containes */
struct domain _pixels *the; /* pointers to the domain data */ 
struct classified domain *next; /* in the structure above. There */
} **the_domain[3][24]; /* are three classes with 24 sub- */
/* classes. Using this array, only */
/* domains and ranges in the same */ 
/* class are compared.. */
/* The first pointer points to the */
/* domain size the the second to */
/* list of domains. */
#define STEGSIZE 64 
int Inserting;
/* Driver function for Hiding and Revealing. */ 
void CStegDoc::HideRevealIt(int inserting)
{
/* Defaults are set initially */




/* size of the input image. */
long stripchar=0; /* chars to ignore in input file. */
FILE * input;
int num_iterations= NUMITERATIONS;
inputfilename[0] = 1; /* We initially set the input to this and */ 
outputfilename[0] = 1; /* then check if the input/output names */
/* have been set below. */
paptr = 1; /* how many bits are packed in sum so far */
pasum = 0; /* packed bits */
panum_of_packed_bytes = 0; /* total bytes written out */
Inserting = inserting; 
if ( Inserting){ 








FirstStegan = 1; 
if  (hsize == -1)
if  (vsize == -1) hsize = vsize = 256; 
else hsize = vsize;
else
if  (vsize == -1) vsize = hsize;
/* allocate memory for the input image. Allocating one chunck saves */
/* work and time later. */
if  (lalloced) {
matrix allocate(domimage[0], (hsize/2), (vsize/2), double) 
matrix_allocate(domimage[l], (hsize/2), (vsize/2), double) 
matrix_allocate(domimage[2], (hsize/2), (vsize/2), double) 
matrix_allocate(domimage[3], (hsize/2), (vsize/2), double)
}
Finish = 0; 
countbits = 0; 
if ( inserting)
{
testfile =  fopen("ins.txt","w"); 
if  (!(EncS»(Thebit)))










/* max_ & min_ part are variable, so this must be run time allocated */ 
bits needed = new int [(l+max_part-min_part)];
/* if (i < hsize*vsize)




sprintf(buf,"%dx%d=%d pixels read from %s.", hsize,vsize,i,inputfilename); 
Print(buf);
}*/
/* allcate memory for domain data and initialize it */ 
compute_sums(hsize,vsize);
/* output some data into the outputfile. */
/* This is the quantized value o f zero scaling., needed later */ 
zero ia lpha = 0.5 + (max_scale)/(2.0*max_scale)*(l«s_bits);
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/* The following routine takes a rectangular image and calls the */
/* quadtree routine to encode square sum-images in it. */
/* the tolerance is a parameter since in some applications different */
/* regions o f the image may need to be compressed to different tol's */
StatusMsg("Encoding Image ");




// for (i=0; i<10; ++i)
apply_transformations(0);
}









/* Free allocated memory*/ 
delete [] bits needed;
/* for (i=0;i<vsize/2;i++)
{
delete [] domimage[0][i]; 
delete [] domimage[l][i]; 
delete [] domimage[2][i]; 
delete [] domimage[3][i];
}
delete [] domimagefO]; 
delete [] dom image) 1]; 
delete [] domimage[2]; 
delete [] domimage[3]; */ 
delete [] domain.no h domains;
delete [] domain.domain hsize; 
delete [] domain.domain vsize; 
delete [] domain.domain hstep; 
delete [] domain.domain_vstep; 
for (i=0; i <= max_ part-m in jart; ++i)
for (J=0dom ain.no_v_dom ains[i];j++) 
delete f] domain.pixel[i][j]; 
for (i=0; i <= max_part-min_part; ++i) 
delete [] domain.pixel[i]; 
delete [] domain.no v domains; 
delete [] domain.pixel;
/*for (i=0;i<vsize;i++)
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/* not average 2x2 sub-images to pixels. This is needed for clas- */
/* sifying ranges rather than domain where decimation is needed. */
int gsame = 0; 
int gsameflag = 0;
void averagel(int x,int y,int xsize,int ysize, double * psum,double * psum2) 
{
register int i,j; 
register double pixel;
*psum = *psum2 = 0.0; 
gsame = Enclmage[y][x]; 
gsameflag = 0; 
for (i=x; i<x+xsize; ++i) 
for 0=y; j<y+ysize; ++j) { 






/* Take a region of the image at x,y and classify it. */
/* The four quadrants of the region are ordered from brightest to */
/* least bright average value, then it is rotated into one of the */
/* three cannonical orientations possible with the brightest quad */
/* in the upper left comer. */
/* The routine returns two indices that are class numbers: pfirst */
/* and psecond; the symmetry operation that bring the square into */
/* cannonical position; and the sum and sumA2 of the pixel values */
void classify(int x, int y, int xsize, int ysize,int * pfirst,int * psecond, 
int * psym, double * psum, double *psum2, int type)
/* position, size o f subimage to be classified */
/* returned first and second class numbers */
/* returned symmetry operation that brings the */
/* subimage to cannonical position. */
I* returned sum and sumA2 of pixel values */
/* flag for decimating (for domains) or not */
{
int order[4], i,j; 
double a[4],a2[4];
void (*average_func)(int,int,int , in t , double * ,double * );
if (type == 2) average func = average; else average func = average 1;
/* get the average values of each quadrant */
(*average_func)(x,y, xsize/2,ysize/2, &a[0], &a2[0]);
(*average_fune)(x,y+ysize/2, xsize/2,ysi?.e/2, & a[l], &a2[l]);
(*average_func)(x+xsize/2,y+ysize/2, xsize/2,ysize/2, &a[2], &a2[2]); 
(*average_func)(x+xsize/2,y, xsize/2,ysize/2, &a[3], &a2[3]);
*psum = a[0] + a[l] + a[2] + a[3];
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*psum2 = a2[0 ] + a2[l] + a2[2] + a2[3];
for (i=0; i<4; ++i) {
/* after the sorting below order[i] is the i-th brightest */
/* quadrant. */
order[i] = i;
/* convert a2[] to store the variance o f each quadrant */ 
a2[i] -= (double)(l«(2*type))*a[i]*a[i]/(double)(xsize*ysize);
}
/* Now order the average value and also in order[], which will */
/* then tell us the indices (in a[]) of the brightest to darkest */ 






/* because o f the way we ordered the a[] the rotation can be */
/* read right off o f  order[]. That will make the brightest */
/* quadrant be in the upper left corner. But we must still */
/* decide which cannonical class the image portion belogs */
/* to and whether to do a flip or just a rotation. This is */
/* the following table summarizes the horrid lines below */
/* order class do a rotation */
/* 0,2,1,3 0 0 */
/* 0,2,3,1 0 1 */
/* 0,1,2,3 1 0 */
/* 0,3,2,1 1 1 */
/* 0,1,3,2 2 0 */
/* 0,3,1,2 2 1 */
*psym = order[0];
/* rotate the values */ 
for (i=0; i<4; ++i)
order[i] = (order[i] - (*psym) + 4)%4;
for (i=0; order[i] != 2; ++i);
*pfirst = i-1;
if  (order[3] =  1 || (*pfirst == 2 && order[2] == 1)) *psym += 4;
/* Now further classify the sub-image by the variance of its */ 
/* quadrants. This give 24 subclasses for each o f the 3 classes */ 
for (i=0; i<4; ++i) order[i] = i;






/* Now do the symmetry operation */ 
for (i=0; i<4; ++i)
order[i] =  (order[i] - (*psym%4) + 4)%4; 
if  (*psym > 3)
for (i=0; i<4; ++i)
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if  (order[i]%2) order[i] = (2 + order[i])%4;
/* We want to return a class number from 0 to 23 depending on */ 
/* the ordering of the quadrants according to their variance */ 
*psecond = 0; 
for (i=2; i>=0; —i) 
for (j=0;j<=i; ++j)
if (orderjj] > order[j+l]) { 
swap(order[j],order|j+l], int); 
if  (order[j] == 0 || order [j+1] == 0)
*psecond += 6; 
else if  (order[j] == 1 || order [j+1] =  1)
*psecond += 2; 
else if  (orderjj] == 2 || order [j+1] =  2)
*psecond += 1 ;
}
*********************************$************************** */ 
/* Compute sum and sumA2 of pixel values in domains for use in */
/* the m is computation later. Since a domain is compared with */
/* many ranges, doing this just once saves a lot of computation */
/* This routine also fills a list structure with the domains */
/* as they are classified and creates the memory for the domain */













struct classified domain *node;
StatusMsg("Computing domain sum s...");
I* pre-decimate the image into doniimage to avoid having to */
/* do repeated averaging o f 2x2 pixel groups. *1
/* There are 4 ways to decimate the image, depending on the */
/* location of the domain, odd or even address. */
for (i=0; i<2; ++i)
for (j=0; j<2; ++j)
for (k=i; k<hsize-i; k += 2)
for (l=j; l<vsize-j; 1 += 2)
d o m im a g e [ ( i« l)+ j] [ l» l ] [k » l]  =
((double)EncImage[l][k] + (double)Enclmage[l+l][k+l] + 
(double)Enc!mage[l][k+l] + (double)EncImage[l+l][k])*0.25;
/* Allocate memory for the sum and sumA2 o f domain pixels */
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/* We first compute the size of the largest square that fits in */
/* the image. */
xexponen t = (int)floor(log((double)hsize)/log(2.0)); 
y_exponent = (int)floor(log((double)vsize)/log(2.0));
/* exponent is min of x_ and y_ exponent */
max exponent = (xexponent > y_exponent ? y_exponent: x_exponent);
/* size is the size of the largest square that fits in the image */
/* It is used to compute the domain and range sizes. */
size=  l«m ax_exponent;
if  (m axexponent < max_part)
Fatal("Reduce maximum number o f quadtree partitions."); 
if (max_exponent-2 < max jpart)
Print("\nWarning: so many quadtree partitions yield absurd ranges.");
i = max_part - min j» art + 1; 
domain.no_h_domains = new int [i]; 
domain.no_v_domains = new int [i]; 
dom ain.dom ainhsize = new int [i]; 
domain.domain_vsize = new int [i]; 
domain.domain_hstep = new int [i]; 
dom ain.dom ainvstep = new int [i];
domain.pixel= (struct domain pixels ***)
new char [(i*sizeof(struct domain pixels **))]; 
if (domain.pixel == NULL) Fatal("No memory for domain pixel sums.");
for (i=0; i <= m axj)art-m in_part; ++i) {
/* first compute how many domains there are horizontally */ 
domain.domain_hsize[i] = size »  (min_part+i-l); 
if (dom type == 2)
domain. domain_hstep[i] = dom step; 
else if (dom type == 1)
if  (dom step type =  1) 
domain.domain_hstep[i] = (size »  (max_part - i-l))*dom_step; 
else
domain.domain_hstep[i] = (size »  (max_part - i-l))/dom_step;
else
if (dom_step_type = = 1) 
domain.domain_hstep[i] = domain. domain_hsize[i]*dom_step; 
else
domain. domain_hstep[i] = domain.domain_hsize[i]/dom_step;
domain. no_h_domains[i] = l+(hsize-domain.domain_hsize[i])/
domain. domain Jistep [i]; 
/* bits_needed[i][0] = ceil(log(domain.no_h_domains[i])/log(2.0)); */
I* now compute how many domains there are vertically. The sizes */
/* are the same for square domains, but not for rectangular ones */ 
domain.domain_vsize[i] = size »  (min part+i-1); 
if (dom type == 2)
domain.domain_vstep[i] = dom step; 
else if (dom_type ==1)
if (dom_step_type == 1) 
domain.domain _vstep[i] = (size »  (max_part - i-l))*dom_step; 
else
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domain.domain_vstep[i] = (size »  (max_part - i-l))/dom_step;
else
if (dom_step_type == 1) 
domain. domain_vstep[i] = domain. domain_vsize[i]*dom_step; 
else
domain.domain_vstep[i] = domain.domain_vsize[i]/dom_step;
domain.nov_domains[ i] = l+(vsize-domain.domain_vsize[i])/
domain. dom ainvstep[i];




domain.no_v_domains[i], struct dom ain jixe ls)
/* allocate and zero the list containing the classified domain data */ 
i = max_part - min_part + 1; 
for (flrst class = 0; first class < 3; ++first_class) 
for (secondclass = 0; second_class < 24; ++second_class) { 
the_domain[first_c lass] [second_c lass] =
(struct classified_domain * *)
new char [(i*sizeof(struct classifieddom ain *))];
for (j=0; j<i; ++j)
the_domain[first_class][second_class][j] = NULL;
}
/* Precompute sum and sum of squares for domains */
/* This part can get faster for overlapping domains if repeated */
/* sums are avoided */
for (i=0; i <= max_part-min part; ++i) { 
for (j=0,domain_x=0; j<domain.no_h_domains[i]; ++j, 
domain_x+=domain.domain _hstep[i]) 
for (k=0,domain_y=0; k<domain.no v domains[i]; ++k, 
domain_y+=domain.domain_vstep[i]) { 







/* When the domain data is referenced from the list, we need to */
I* know where the domain is., so we have to store the position */ 
domain.pixel[i][k][j].dom_x = j; 
domain.pixel[i][k][j].dom_y = k; 
node = (struct classified domain *)
new char [(sizeof(struct classified domain))];
/* put this domain in the classified list structure */ 
node->the = &domain.pixel[i][k][j]; 
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/* Now we make sure no domain class is actually empty. */ 
for (i=0; i <= max_part-min_part; ++i) 
for (first_class = 0; first class < 3; ++first_class) 
for (second_class = 0; second_class < 24; ++second_class) 
if(the_domain[first_class]jsecond_class][i] ==NULL) { 
node = (struct classified_domain *)
new char [(sizeof(struct classified_domain))]; 









int fmdalpha(int i, int j,int il,in t j l )
{
static unsigned char DI,DI1; 
static double pixel,pixel 1;
if ( doit == 2 ) { 
galpha=((double)DI - (double)DIl)/(pixel-pixell); 
gbeta = (double)DIl - galpba*pixell; 
return 1;
/*fprintf(testfile,"DI=%d D ll = %d s=%lf o=%lf',DI,Dll,galpha,gbeta); */ \
}
cntit++; 
i f ( cntit> 4 )  
return 0;
DI =  E nd  mage [j][i]; 





if ( doit =  0 )
{
D ll =D I;
pixell = ((Enclm age[jl][il]+Enclm age[jl][il+1]+Enclm age[]l+I][il]+




if  ( DI != D ll )
{
pixel = ((Enclm age[jl][il]+Enclm age[jl][il+1]+Enclm age[jl+I][il]+ 
E ncIm age[jl+ l][il+l])/4.0); 
if  ( fabs((pixel - pixell)) <0.1)
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int RetrieveCmp(int i, int j, int i l ,  int j  1)
{
unsigned char en,enl; 
double d,p;
p = ((double)(EncImage[j I][il]+Enclmage[j I][il+1]+Enclmage[j l+ l][ il]+  
EncIm age[jl+ l][il+ l])/4.0); 
en = Enclmage[j][i]; 
enl = bound(0.5+ galpha*p+gbeta); 
if ( en && en !=255 )
{








j* *************************************** *************** ****** */
/* Compare a range to a domain and return the correlation coefficient. This function 
/* Is also used to build the RMS value for a domain and range. */y* ************************************************************ */
double compare(int atx, int aty, int xsize, int ysize, int depth,
double rsum, double rsum2, int dom_x, int dom_y, 
int sy m o p , int * pialpha, int * pibeta)
{
int i, j, am t,il, j l ,  k, 
dom ainx ,
domain_y; /* The domain position */
double pixell,a,b,d,pixel=0.0,
det, /* determinant of solution */ 
dsum, /* sum o f domain values */ 
rdsum = 0.0, /* sum of range*domain values */ 
dsum2, /* sum o f domainA2 values */
w2 = 0, /* total number of values tested */
rms = 0.0, /* root means square difference */
alpha, /* the scale factor */ 
beta; /* The offset */ 
int first = l,m=0,ml,m2,valsub,totvalsub,found=0; 
int ret=0,DI,Dll,am,amount;
double x,y,r=0.0,N,t2=0.0,B=0.0,M=0.O,p=0.0,pl=0.0,sO=0.0,sl=0.0,s2=0.0,t0=0.0,tl=0.0; 
unsigned char calcM B=l,dm,en,enl; 
double R3,EV=0.0,EV 1 ,TV=0.0,TV 1 ,yhat;
/* xsize =  hsize »  depth; */
/* ysize = vsize »  depth; */ 
gcmp = 1; 
doit = 0;
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cntit=0;
w2 = xsize * ysize; 
domval = rangeval = 0.0;
dsum = domain.pixel[depth-min_part][dom_y][dom_x].sum;
yhat = dsum/(double)w2; 
dsum2 = domain.pixel[depth-min_part][dom__y][dom_x].sum2;
domain_x = (dom_x * domain.domain_hstep[depth-min_part]); 
do m ainy  = (dom_y * domain.domain_vstep[depth-minjpart]); 
k = ((dom ain_x% 2)«l) + domain_y%2; 
am = 2; 
amt = 2;
// used as inner loop index as well
// if  ( Inserting)
{
am = 1; 
am t=  1;
d o m a in s  » =  1; 
dom ainy  » =  1;
}
/* The main statement in this routine is a switch statement which */
/* scans through the domain and range to compare them. The loop */ 
/* center is the same so we #define it for easy modification */
#define COMPUTEJLOOP { if  (Inserting) { \
if  (! around) {\
pixel = domimage[k] [j 1 ] [i 1 ] ; \
rdsum += Enclmage[j][i]*pixel; \
}\else{V* Correlation Coefficient Calculation. */ 










if ( x && x < 254 )\
(\
s0++; \
y = domimage[k][jl][il]+valsub;totvals+=domimage[k](jl][il]; \ 
if (found){dsum+=y;dsum2+=y*y;}\
tO += y;\ 
tl  += y*x;\ 
t2 += y*y;\ 
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for ( amount=0;amount<l;amount++) { 
switch(sym_op) {
case 0:
for (i=atx, i l  = domain_x; i<atx+xsize; ++i, il+=am)
for (j=aty, j 1 = dom ainy ; j<aty+ysize; ++j, j 1 +=am) 
COM PUTELOOP 
break;
case 1: for (j=aty, i l  = domain_x; j<aty+ysize; ++j, i l  += am)
for (i=atx+xsize-l, j l  = domain y; i>=atx; —i, il += am) 
COMPUTE JLOOP 
break;
case 2: for (i=atx+xsize-l, i l  = dom ainx ; i>=atx; —i, il += am) 
for (j=aty+ysize-l, j l  = domain_y; j>=aty; —j, j l  += am) 
COM PUTE_LOOP 
break;
case 3: for (j=aty+ysize-l, i l  = domain x; j>=aty; —j, il += am) 
for (i=atx, jl = domain y; i<atx+xsize; ++i, j l  += am) 
COMPUTE_LOOP 
break;
case 4: for (¡=aty, il = dom ainx ; j<aty+ysize; ++j, il += am) 
fo r (i=atx ,jl = domain y; i<atx+xsize; ++i, j l  += am) 
COMPUTEJLOOP 
break;
case 5: for (i=atx, il = domain x; i<atx+xsize; ++i, il += am)
for (j=aty+ysize-l, j l  = domain_y; j>=aty; —j, j l  += am) 
COM PUTELOOP 
break;
case 6: for (j=aty+ysize-l, i l  = domain x; j>=aty; —j, il += am) 
for (i=atx+xsize-l, jl = domain y; i>=atx; —i, j l  += am) 
COMPUTE_LOOP 
break;
case 7: for (i=atx+xsize-l, il = domain x; i>=atx; —i, il += am) 










N  = sO;
sqrtit = (N*s2-sl *sl)*(N*t2-t0*t0); 




dem = s0*s2 - s l* s l; 
if ( dem < 1.0E-10 || sqr < 1.0E-10) 
return 0.0;
M M =M  = (s0*tl - sl*t0) /  dem;
BB =B = (s2*t0 - s l* tl)  / dem; 
r = (N*tl - sl*t0)/sqr;
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R2 = r;
r2sums += fabs(r);




else{/* Hide Pseudo Code */
det = (xsize*ysize)*dsum2 - dsum*dsum;
if  (det == 0.0)
alpha = 0.0;
else
alpha = (w2*rdsum - rsum*dsum)/det;
if  (only positive && alpha < 0.0) alpha = 0.0;
*pialpha = 0.5 + (alpha + m ax_scale)/(2.0*max_scale)*(l«s_bits);
if (*pialpha < 0) *pialpha = 0;
if (*pialpha >= l« s_ b its )  *pialpha = ( l« s _ b i t s ) - l ;
alpha = (double)*pialpha/(double)(l«s_bits)*(2.0*max_scale)-max_scale;
/* compute the offset */ 
beta = (rsum - alpha*dsum)/w2;
/* Convert beta to an integer */
/* we use the sign information o f alpha to pack efficiently */ 
if (alpha > 0.0) beta += alpha*GREY_LEVELS;
*pibeta =  0.5 + beta/
((1.0+fabs(alpha))*GREY_LEVELS)*((l«o_bits)-l); 
if (*pibeta< 0) *pibeta = 0; 
if  (*pibeta>= l« o _ b its )  *pibeta = (1 « o  bits)-1;
/* Recompute beta from the integer */
beta = (double)*pibeta/(double)((l«o_bits)-l)*
((1.0+fabs(alpha))* GRE Y LEV ELS); 
if (alpha > 0.0) beta -= alpha*GREY_LEVELS;
}
else{
R2 = (EV/TV); 





/* Compute the rms based on the quantized alpha and beta! */ 
rms= sqrt((rsum2 + alpha*(alpha*dsum2 - 2.0*rdsum + 2.0*beta*dsum) + 
beta*(beta*w2 - 2.0*rsum))/w2);
else
if  ( found && trans) 
trans=trans->next;
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retum(rms);
}




/* Recursively partition an image, computing the best transfoms */
/ *  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  * /  
void quadtree(int atx, int aty, int xsize,int ysize, double tol, int depth)
/* the tolerance fit */
{
double alpha,beta;
int fcount 1 ,i, doit, count, found=0,count 1, 
domain_x, 
domain_y,
sym op, /* A symmetry operation o f the square */
¡alpha, /* Intgerized scalling factor */
¡beta, /* Intgerized offset */
bestjalpha, /* best ialpha found */
best_ibeta,
best_sym_op,




first_class_start, /* loop beginning and ending values */ 
first class end, 
second_class[2], 
the_second_class,
second_class_start, I* loop beginning and ending values */ 
secon dc lassend ,
range_sym_op[2], /* the operations to bring square to */
domain_sym_op; /* cannonical position. */
long domain ref;
struct classified domain *node; /* var for domains we scan through */
double nns, best rms, /* rms value and min rms found so far */
best_m,best_b,best_r2,sum=0, sum2=0; /* sum and sumA2 o f range pixels */
char buf[200];
if  ( F inish) 
return;
sprintf(buf, "quadtree to x=%d y=%d",atx,aty);
StatusMsg(buf);
/* keep breaking down the image until we are small enough */ 
if (depth < max_part) {
quadtree(atx,aty, xsize/2, ysize/2, tol,depth+l); 
quadtree(atx+xsize/2,aty, xsize/2, ysize/2,tol,depth+l); 
quadtree(atx,aty+ysize/2, xsize/2, ysize/2,tol,depth 11); 
quadtree(atx+xsize/2,aty+ysize/2, xsize/2, ysize/2,tol,depth+1); 
return;
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/* now search for the best domain-range match and write it out */ 
b e s trm s = 20.0; /* just a big number */
rms = 90.0; 
classify(atx, aty, xsize,ysize,
&the_flrst_class, &the_second_class, 
&range_sym_op[0], &sum, &sum2, 1);
/* sort out how much to search based on -f  and -F input flags */ 
if  (fullclass search) {
first_class_start = 0; 
f irs tc la s s e n d  = 3;
} else {
first class start = the first class; 
first_class_end = the _first_class+l;
}
if  (subclass_search) {
second_class_start = 0; 
second_class_end = 24;
} else {
secondclass start = the_second_ class; 
second_class_end = the_second_class+l;
}
/* these for loops vary according to the optimization flags we set */
/* for subclass_search and fullclass_search==l, we search all the */
/* domains (except not all rotations). */
count = 0; 
found = 0;
int thecount,thecountl;
if ( ((Inserting && gsameflag > 2) || ¡Inserting) && depth == m ax_part){ 
for (first class = first class start;
first class < first_class_end; ++first_class) 
for (second_class[0] = secon dclassstart;
second_class[0] < second class end; ++second_class[0]) {
/* We must check each domain twice. Once for positive scaling, */
/* once for negative scaling. Each has its own class and sym op */ 
if (¡only _positive) {
second_class[l] =
class_transform[(first_class =  2 ? 1 : 0)]|second class[0]|; 
rangesym _op[l] = 
rot_transform[(the_first_class == 2 ? 1 : 0)][range_sym_op[0]];
}
/* only positive is 0 or 1, so we may or not scan */
for (i=0; i<l/*(2-only_positive)*/; ++i)
for (node = the domain[first_class][second_class[i|][depth-min part]; 
node != NULL; 
node = node->next) {
domain_x = (node->the->dom_x * domain.domain_hstep[depth-min_part]); 
domain_y = (node->the->dom_y * domain.domain_vstep[depth-minj3art]);
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/* Set the positions of the regions */
if  ( domain_y >= STEGSIZE ) 
count++;
else
if (dom ainx  >= STEGSIZE)
»
}
if ( count < 2 ) 
return; 
doit = 0;
fcountl=countl = 0; 
found = 0;
if  ( depth <= max_part)
for (first_class = f irs tc la sss ta rt;
first class < f irs tc la ssen d ; ++first_class) 
for (second_class[0] = sccon dclasssta rt;
second classfO] < second_class_end; ++second_class[0]) {
/* We must check each domain twice. Once for positive scaling, */
/* once for negative scaling. Each has its own class and sy m o p  */ 
if (!only_positive) {
second_class[l] =
class_transform[(first_ class = = 2  ? 1 : 0)][second_class[0]]; 
ra n g e sy m o p  [ 1 ] = 
rot_transform[(the_first_class == 2 ? 1 : 0)][range_sym_op[0]];
}
/* only_positive is 0 or 1, so we may or not scan */
for (i=0; i<l/*(2-only_positive)*/; ++i)
for (node = the_domain[first_class][second_class[i]][depth-min_part]; 
node != NULL; 
node = node->next) { 
d o m a in sy m o p  = node->the->sym;
/* The following if statement figures out how to transform */
/* the domain onto the range, given that we know how to get */
/* each into cannonical position. */
/* Pseudo Code : Reveal(l) */
{/* Pseudo Code : Hide(2) */
if  (((domain_sym_op>3 ? 4: 0) + (range_sym op[i ]>3 ? 4: 0))%8 == 0) 
sym_op = (4 + domain_sym_op%4 - range_sym_op[i]%4)%4;
else
sym_op = (4 + (dom ain sym op % 4 + 3*(4-range_sym_op[i]%4))%4)%8; 
if ( atx == 0 && aty == 0 && node->the->dom_x == 8 && node->the->dom_y =  18) 
d o m a in sy m o p  = 1;
domain x = (node->the->dom_x * domain.domain_hstep[depth-min_part]); 
domain y = (node->the->dom_y * domain.domain_vstep[depth-min_part]);
doit = 0;
if  ( domain_y >= STEGSIZE ) 
doit = 1 ; 
else
if (domain x >= STEGSIZE) 
doit = 0; 
if  ( doit )
{
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count 1++;
if  (Inserting)






b = best_rms; 
for (sym_op=0;sym_op<8;sym_op++) {
d = compare(atx,aty, xsize, ysize, depth, sum,sum2, 
node->the->dom_x, 
node->the->dom_y, 
sym op, &ialpha,&ibeta); 








/* Pseudo Code : Hide(3) */
// if ( rms < INSERTTOL && depth != max _part)
// return; 
if  ( Inserting)
{
if ( rms < best rms && rms< INSERTTOL 
/* Pseudo Code : H ide(l) */
















else/* Pseudo Code: Reveal. */
if  ( !gcmp ){ 
nokey = 1;
if  ( countl < c o u n t»  1)
DecS «  1; 
else
DecS «  0; /* Pseudo Code: Reveal. */
if ( DecS.LsFin())
Finish = 1; 
return;
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if ( found )
{
found = 0;
/* if  ( ¡Inserting ){/* Pseudo Code: Reveal (2) */ 
nokey = 1;
if  ( thecountl < th eco u n t»  1)
DecS «  1; 
else 
DecS «  0; 
if ( DecS.LsFin() )






beta = ((double)((bestibeta& (0x7f)))/(double)((l«o_bits)-l)*
((1.0+fabs(aIpha))* GREY_LEVELS));
if (alpha > 0.0) beta -= alpha* GREY_LEV ELS;
// if ( fabs(alpha *GREY_LEVELS + beta) > 30.0 )
// continue;
struct transformation_node * t; 
t  = (struct transformation node *)
new char [(sizeof(struct transformation node ))]; 
t->next = NULL; 
t->scale = alpha; 
t->offset = beta; 
t->next = NULL; 
if (best ialpha != zero ialpha) { 
t-> sym op = best sym op;
t->dx = (double)best domain x * domain.domain_hstep[depth-min_part]; 
t->dy = (double)best_domain_y * domain. domain_vstep[depth-min_part];
} else { 
t-> sym op = 0; 
t-> dx = 0; 
t-> dy = 0;
}
t->rx = atx; 
t->ry = aty; 
t->depth = depth;
t->rrx = atx + xsize; 
t->rry = aty + ysize; 
t->pos = 0; 










if  (¡found && depth < in a x j  art) {
/* We didn't find a good enough fit so quadtree down */
/* This bit means we quadtree'd down */ 
quadtree(atx,aty, xsize/2, ysize/2, tol,depth+I); 
quadtree(atx+xsize/2,aty, xsize/2, ysize/2, tol,depth+l); 
quadtree(atx,aty+ysize/2, xsize/2, ysize/2, tol,depth+l); 
quadtree(atx+xsize/2,aty+ysize/2, xsize/2, ysize/2, tol,depth+l);
}
/* ************************************************************* */ 
/* Recursively partition an image, finding the largest contained */
/* square and call the quadtree routine the encode that square. */
/* This enables us to encode rectangular image easily. *//* ************************************************************* */ 
void partition_im age(int atx, int aty, int hsize, int vsize,double tol)
{
int xexponent, /* the largest power of 2 image size that fits */ 
yexponent, /* horizontally or vertically the rectangle. */ 
exponent, I* The actual size o f  image that’s encoded. */ 
size, 
depth;
xexponen t = (int)floor(log((double)hsize)/log(2.0)); 
y_exponent = (int)floor(log((double)vsize)/log(2.0));
/* exponent is min o f x_ and y_ exponent */ 
exponent = (x exponent > y_exponent ? y exponent: x exponent); 
size = 1 «ex po nen t; 
depth = max exponent - exponent; 
quadtree(atx,aty,size,size,tol,depth); 
if (size != hsize) 
partition_image(atx+size, aty, hsize-size,vsize, tol);
if (size != vsize) 
partition_image(atx, aty+size, size,vsize-size, tol);
}
/* This code builds the new range blocks. */ 
void apply_transform ations(int which)
{
IMAGE_TYPE ** tempi mage;
int i,j,il,cnt=0,jl,count=0; 
double pixel,scal,off,d; 
unsigned char firstval; 
int ch, chi; 
char array[20];
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cnt=0;
/* Since the inner loop is the same in each case o f the switch below */
/* we just define it once for easy modification. */
#defme COMPUTE_LOOP { \
if ( cnt && cnt < trans->pos-l )\
Declmage[j][i] = firstval;\ 
else\ /* Pseudo Code : Hide(4) */
{ seal = trans->scalel ;\ 
o f f= trans->offsetl ;\ 
pixel = ((Enclm age[jl][il]+Enclm age[jl][il+1]+Enclm age[jl+I][il]+ \ 
EncIm age[jl+ l][il+ l])/4.0); \
ch = Declmage[j][i];\
/* Pseudo Code : Hide(5) */
Declmage[j][i] = bound(0.5 + scal*pixel+off);\ 
ch l=((unsigned mt)DecImage[j][i])-ch;\ 







case 0: for (i=trans->rx, il = trans->dx;
i<trans->rrx; ++i, il += 2) 
for (j=trans->ry, j  1 = trans->dy;
j<trans->rry; ++j, j l  += 2)
COMPUTE_LOOP
break;
case 1: for (j=trans->ry, il  =trans->dx;
j<trans->rry; ++j, il += 2) 
for (i=trans->rrx-1,
il = trans->dy; i>=(int)trans->rx; —i, j l  += 2) 
COM PUTELOOP 
break;
case 2: for (i=trans->rrx-l,
il = trans->dx; i>=(int)trans->rx; —i, il += 2) 
for (j=trans->rry-l,
j l  = trans->dy; j>=(int)trans->ry; —j, j l  += 2) 
COM PUTELOOP 
break;
case 3: for (j=trans->rry-l,
il =  trans->dx; j>=(int)trans->ry; —j, il  +=2) 
for (i=trans->rx, j 1 = trans->dy;
i<trans->rrx; ++i, j  1 += 2)
COM PUTELOOP
break;
case 4: for (j=trans->ry, il  = trans->dx;
j<trans->rry; ++j, il += 2) 
for (i=trans->rx, j  1 = trans->dy;
i<trans->rrx; ++i, j 1 + = 2)
COM PUTELOOP
break;
case 5: for (i=trans->rx, il  = trans->dx;
i<trans->rrx; ++i, il + = 2) 
for (j=trans->rry-l,
j  1 = trans->dy; j>=(int)trans->ry; —j, j  1 += 2) 
COMPUTE LOOP
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break;
case 6: for (j=trans->rry-l,
i l  = trans->dx; j>=(int)trans->ry; —j ,  il  += 2) 
for (i=trans->rrx-l,
j l  = trans->dy; i>=(int)trans->rx; —i, j  1 += 2) 
COMPUTELOOP 
break;
case 7: for (i=trans->rrx-l,
il  = trans->dx; i>=(int)trans->rx; — i, i l  += 2) 
for (j=trans->ry, j l  = trans->dy;




if  ( trans)
trans = trans->next;
>
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C .5  The S te g an o g ra p h ic  Bit Stream  C o d e
/*Stegan M odule.*/
/* Code for manipulating the steganographic bit streams. */




unsigned char * data; 
unsigned char * Is; 
int posls;











void initchar(const char *init);
int operator»(unsigned char & bit);












data = rs=!s = 0; 
sz = 0;








data = new unsigned char[size]; 
Is = rs = data; 
lsfin = rsfin = 0; 
posls = posrs = 1;
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data = new unsigned char[sz = strlen(stegan)+l]; 
strcpy((char *)data,stegan);
Is = rs = data;
Isfin = rsfin = 0; 




if ( data )
{
lsfin = rsfin = 0;
Is = rs = data; 




void Stegan::initchar(const char * ¡nit)
{
if (da ta) 
delete data;
data = new unsigned char[sz = strlen(init)+1 ]; 
strcpy((char *)data,init);
Is =  rs =  data; 
posls = posrs = 1; 




if (d a ta ) 
delete data; 
data = new unsigned char[sz =  siz];
Is = rs = data; 
posls = posrs = 1;






int Stegan::operator»(unsigned char & bit)
{
unsigned char thechar;
if ( rsfin ) 
return 0;
if ( posrs =  0x100 )
{
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posrs = 1 ; 
if (!*rs) 




if (*rs & posrs) 
bit = 1 ;







void Stegan::operator«(unsigned char bit) 
{
unsigned char thechar;
if ( Isfin ) 
return;
if ( posls == 0x100 )
{
posls = 1 ; 
i f ( !*ls ) 




*ls |= posls; 
posls « =  1 ;
}
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